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THE AMERICAN PUBLIC DOMAIN 
AND THE COURTESY OF 
THE TRADE IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 
{A] literary pira~ is not only not an out1awj he is protuted by the law. 
He is the product of law. 
-1hePublishers'Wukly (1882)' 
[Trade courtesy] was a brief realization of the ideals of philosophical antU'chism-
self-regulation without law. 
-Henry Holt (1908)1 
In 1891, at the age of thirty-nine, 'Thomas Bird Mosher ofPortIand, Maine, 
began a career of fine book pubUshing. 'The small volumes he lovingly 
designed in his shop on Exchange Street were tasteful and elegant, printed 
on fine paper, stamped with a dolphin-and-anchor device borrowed from 
Aldus Manutius, and surprisingly affordable. Books in his Old World Series 
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'The dispute in the pages of The Critic rang the changes on the piracy 
question as it had been debated over the previous six decades. Positions 
had become polarized, and moralized. By the 18805, the anti-piracy camp 
viewed reprinters like Mosher as "gentlemen of the road," lining their pock-
ets at the expense of helpless European authors. 'The pro-reprinting con-
tingent disagreed, hailing Mosher as a "kind of 'literary Johnny Appleseed,' 
disseminating to a mass audience the seeds of literary appreciation and cul-
tural revival."13 Anyway, his supporters insisted, Mosher was only exercising 
his legal rights under American law. 
'The anti-pirates rejected these apologetics as grossly insensitive to the 
moral rights of authors. Surely, they reasoned, an ethical obligation to 
honor writers' creative labors trumped mere legal opportunism. Scrambling 
for the high ground, the pro-reprinters countered that no appeal to moral 
rights could justify an enforced scarcity ofletters. British authors and pub-
lishers had only themselves to blame if they issued appealing books in 
small print runs at high prices. Mosher and his brethren were doing noth-
ing more than lawfully serving the "impecunious republic ofbooklovers";14 
ordinary Americans had a right to cheap, good books. 'The anti-pirates, 
immune to the romance of dissemination, replied that an author deserves 
some remuneration for creative effort; Mosher may have offered hono-
raria, but he did so insolently and only after he had raked in profits from 
his furtive enterprise. 'These entrenched positions, set forth so colorfully in 
the Lang-Mosher dispute, typified the decades-long controversy over the 
practice of unauthorized though lawful reprinting of European authors in 
the United States. 
'Thomas Bird Mosher was a transitional figure in American publishing. 
He plied his reprint trade during a period of enormous change in American 
copyright law and in the publishing industry. 'The year in which he com-
menced operations, 1891, was the same year in which the U.S. Congress 
enacted the Chace International Copyright Act. 'The Chace Act made copy-
right protection available, for the first time, to non-U.S. authors, though on 
stringent conditions that often defeated their efforts to obtain rights, and 
in the service of a policy that openly protected the interests of American 
typesetters and platemakers. As of 1923, the year of Mosher's death, sub-
sequent legislation-the 1909 copyright act-continued to erect obsta-
cles for fOreign authors and preserved many of the protectionist features 
of the 1891 act. 'The controversy over literary piracy had declined from its 
· . . 
.~ 
-
Figure 1.1 Thomas Bird Mosher, the Pirate 
of Portland, 1901. (Courtesy Philip 
R. Bishop, Thomas Bird Mosher Collection) 
pre-1900 intensity, but it had not entirely subsided. Certain transatlantic 
writers-notably and vociferously, Ezra Pound-protested u.s. copyright 
law and policy and denounced the license it continued to give to unauthor-
ized reprinting in the United States. By 1926, James Joyce and T. S. Eliot, 
who had recently achieved fame with mysses and The Waste Land, respec-
tively, were complaining that their writings were being pirated by the New 
York magazine publisher Samuel Roth. Roth, a devout practitioner of what 
had been called the Mosher Method, responded to their charges with a bra-
zenness and panache worthy of the Pirate of Portland himsel£ I will explore 
the modernist encounter with literary piracy, and Roth's central role in it, in 
later chapters. 
Mosher, despite his self-contented buccaneering, occasionally paid for 
his booty-and not just with the kind of post hoc honorarium he offered 
to Andrew Lang. Mosher gave one of his favorite authors, the Scottish 
writer William Sharp ("Fiona MacLeodn)j $32 outright for the reprinting 
of By Sundown Shores: Studies in Spirituality (1902) and $100 for The Divine 
Adventure (1903)-both previously published in London. He paid $50 for 
Edward McCurdy's collection of essays on Italy and medieval themes, Roses 
of Paestum (1912), first issued in London in 1900. Instead of a flat payment, 
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Mosher sometimes offered a royalty on copies sold. For example, he gave a 
ten percent royalty to George William Russell ("A.B.") for a 1904 reprinting 
of his Homeward: Songs by the Way, originally published in Dublin in 1894.15 
All of these works probably lacked copyright protection in the United States, 
despite the conditional protections extended to foreign books under the 
1891 Chace Act. 
But why would Mosher pay, even occasionally, for what U.S. copyright 
law gave him for free? The answer lies, in part, in the professional mores of 
nineteenth-century American publishers. Up to 1891, and even after, prom-
inent publishers attempted to repair the defects of America's isolationist 
copyrightlawbypracticinganinformal,Dorms-basedsystemofself-regulation 
they called the courtesy of the trade, or trade courtesy. Trade courtesywas a 
voluntary, extralegal system in which many of the larger publishing houses 
behaved as if rights in foreign works existed and could be enforced against 
a publisher who reprinted without authorization. In obedience to courtesy, 
publishers assumed a virtue they lacked under the governing law. By pay-
ing foreign authors or their publishers a sum-token or substantial, as cir-
cumstances permitted-for synthetic rights to reprint authorized editions, 
publishers mimicked the salient features of copyright law, making a show 
of respectability and fairness to authors and avoiding ruinous competition 
among themselves for unprotected books. Trade courtesy was good busi-
ness as well as good manners. 
Mosher's occasional payments of lump sums and royalties to his 
European authors show that he recognized the principles of courtesy. Yet he 
observed these principles fitfully and idiosyncratically for the Simple reason 
that he could take or leave them. His operation was too small and special-
ized to offer competition to, or to invite reprisal from, the major houses that 
depended on courtesy to get along with each other. And by 1900, the cour-
tesy system had receded from the American publishing scene as a visibly 
active form of self-regulation. It did not vanish, however. Throughout the 
first half of the twentieth century it persisted as a publishing ethic and an 
occasional informal remedy, just as long as American copyright law failed to 
offer uniform and complete protection to non-U.S. authors. Most important 
for the present study, trade courtesy was seized upon and adapted by Joyce 
and his representatives as a strategy for combating the piracies of Samuel 
Roth and, later, for securing informal, extralegal protection for Ulysses in the 
United States. The story of courtesy's role in the history of Ulysses and in 
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literary modernism generally will be told in later chapters of this book. The 
present chapter traces the nineteenth-century backgrounds of the modern-
ist encounter with U.S. copyright law: the law's creation of an aggressive 
public dOmain, the rise oflegalized piracy of unprotected foreign works, and 
the courtesy of the trade. 
Legal and Moral Piracy: The 1790 Copyright Act and After 
As inhabitants of the digital age, we usually think. of the word pirate as 
naming the violator of a formal, legally enforceable right-a copyright, a 
patent, a trade secret. The specter of widespread and promiscuous piracy 
has hovered behind much of the febrile property talk and eager lawmak-
ing of recent years. Starting from the premise that digital technology, if 
left unchecked, would destroy incentives to produce and distribute intel-
lectual property, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
of 1998, which provided expansive protections for copy-prevention tech-
nolOgies and copyright management information. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee summarized the prevailing dread: "Due to the ease with 
which digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually 
instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make their works read-
ily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will 
be protected against massive piracy.D 16 The phrase "massive piracy" has 
emotional force in excess of its denotative capacity. Applied, as it often is 
today, to unauthorized file sharing by countless anonymous or pseudony-
mous users in decentralized peer-to-peer networks,.' the'phrase conjures 
up conspiratorial intent to break the law-a gigantic, orchestrated music 
heist-when in fact the very nature of decentralized file sharing scatters 
concerted intent and mens rea over the vast reaches of the World Wide 
Web. This is why the music and movie industries have focused much of 
their litigation efforts on the purveyors of peer-to-peer technolOgies and 
services: Napster, Aimster, Grokster, Kazaa, LimeWue, BitTorrent, and, of 
course, The Pirate Bay. Piracy, in the digital era, as in the past, must have a 
local habitation and a name, and the pirate is almost invariably thought of 
as a wicked lawbreaker, a violator oflegislated or common law rights. 
The concept of the pirate as a foe of the formal copyright law is not new.18 
As long ago as 1936,Judge Leamed Hand, writing fora panel of the u.s. Court 
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit, rejected the idea that a work could not be 
infringing just because portions of it owed nothing to the infringed work. In 
holding that Metro-Goldwyns film Letty Lynton infringed a copyrighted play 
entitled Dishonored Lady, Judge Hand famously wrote, "[I]t is enough that 
substantial parts [of the play] were Uftedj no plagiarist can excuse the wrong 
by showing how much of his work he did not pirate."19 Here, Judge Hand 
used the verb "to pirate" in a sense familiar to contemporary ears: to trespass 
upon a statutory cOpyright 'That meaning has a long history stretching back. 
to the nineteenth century and before. In 1839, Supreme CourtJusticeJoseph 
Story, sitting on the U.S. Circuit Court of Massachusetts, concluded in Gray 
v. RusseU that the defendants had infringed the copyright in a revised edition 
of an old Latin grammar. Likening the modified grammar to an improved 
map that enjoys copyright protection by virtue of the skill and labor that 
have gone into updating public domain materials, Justice Story observed 
that it would be '"downright piracy" to copy the whole of the revised map.20 
COpyright piracy could occur in a variety of forms, added Story. For example, 
"if in one of the large encyclopaedias of the present day, the whole or a large 
portion of a scientific treatise of another author .•. should be incorporated, it 
would be just as much a piracy upon the copyright, as ifitwere published in a 
single volume." Like Judge Hand, Justice Story was using "piracy" in its famil-
iar modern sense: the invasion of an enforceable, state-supplied legal right 
Throughout the nineteenth century, however, running alongside this 
sense of piracy was another meaning of the word: the unauthorized copy-
ing of works that were not protected by copyright in the United States. 'Ibis 
seemingly paradoxical usage was mostly reserved for impugning American 
reprinters who took advantage of Congress's refusal to grant copyright pro-
tection to foreign authors. It is this meaning that Andrew Lang intended 
when he questioned Thomas Bird Mosher's honor for "pirating" his trans-
lation of Aucassin et Nicolete. Joining forces with Lang in the pages of The 
Academy, the English poet and critic Lionel Johnson leveled the additional 
charge that Mosher had "perpetrated a triple piracy" two years earlier when 
he issued an unauthorized reprint of one ofJohnson's essays together with 
Robert Bridges' sonn,et sequence The Growth of Love under the "emblem 
and imprint" used by Bridges' Oxford publisher.11 It was no consolation 
that Mosher professed admiration for the essay. "I would beg Mr. Mosher to 
cease paying sugared compliments to his victims," Johnson wrote. "If a foot-
pad steal my watch, I am not consoled by his approval of its merits."111his 
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doubly false analogy-comparing the lawful use of an intangible work to 
the unlawful taking of tangible property-was typical of the rhetoric of out-
raged authorship in this period. As Catherine Seville has shown, the moral-
istic use of such terms as pirate and footpad to describe the lawful reprinting 
of unprotected literature became increasingly intense as the nineteenth cen-
turywore on and the call for congressional action to protect foreign authors 
grew more strident.13 
Pirate, footpad, gentleman of the road-all were epithets that, when 
accurately employed, condemned actual criminal activity on land or the 
high seas. '!he ~eft of a watch was, and still is, a crime against property. 
Highway robbery was defined as a crime against the person as well as 
against property because typically it -involved harm or a threat. of immi-
nent harm to the victim. Yet the Pirate of Portland had committed no such 
offenses and had infringed no copyrights in reprinting Johnson's essay and 
Bridges' sonnet sequence. 'The works he published in his Old World and 
English Reprint series lay squarely in the American public domain, and 
not by some quirk of legislative negligence. Congress had intended that 
they be there. 
'The express lack of protection for foreign authors' works had been inscribed 
into the law as early as the first federal copyright act of 1790: "[N]othing in 
this act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the importation or vending, 
reprinting, or publishing within the United States, of any map, chart, book or 
books, written, printed, or published by any person not a citizen of the United 
States, in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction of the United States. "l4 
'!his provision, which Meredith L. McGill has called an "extraordinary license 
[for] the unrestricted republication of fOreign texts,"2.S was as unequivocal as it 
was expansive. No map, chart, or book produced by a non-U.S. citizen or non-
resident was protected by copyright within the United States, and the act for-
bade any contrary construction of its language. Qpite simp~ Americans were 
permitted, even encouraged, to import, reprint, publish, or sell foreign works 
without the permission of their authors or publishers. '!he law did nothing less 
than immunize acts that, if committed on U.s. soU against American authors 
enjoying copyright protection, could have resulted in damages and fines along 
with forfeiture and destruction of infringing copies. 26 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, Congress enhanced the 
rights and remedies of American authors but continued to withhold pro-
tection from foreign authors. (U.S. patent law, in contrast, was friendlier to 
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foreign inventors.)17 A revision of the copyright law in 1831 sharpened the 
text of the 1790 act to stress that no copyright protection existed for any 
person not "a citizen of the United States nor resident within the jurisdic-
tion thereof."28 A major revision of 1870 repeated the language of the previ-
ous acts and expanded the legal disability of foreign authors to include any 
"dramatic or musical composition, print, cut, engraving, or photograph. "19 
Here the law stood until the passage of the Chace Act of 1891, which at 
last extended copyright protection, conditionally, to foreign authors, as dis-
cussed below. 
During the nineteenth century, accusations of piracy of foreign works 
often carried a double and shifting valence. On one level, critics might be 
assailing the particular American publisher responsible for an unauthorized 
reprint, as Andrew Lang and Lionel Johnson were in protesting the activi-
ties of Mosher. On another level, critics might be attacking Congress or 
the nation itself for failing to protect foreign authors. Protests sometimes 
blurred the target, making it unclear whether the inertia of politicians or 
the moral failing of businessmen was more to blame. The ambivalence can 
be seen in an 1888 essay by the publisher Henry Holt, who, on the one 
hand, pointed to "the overwhelming competition of foreign stolen goods 
which our. laws encourage" and, on the other, blamed "pirate" publishers 
who sought to excuse their conduct "because their proceedings are within 
the law."30 Some critics distinguished more sharply between legislative and 
individual responsibility. Though a strong advocate of cOpyright protection 
for fOreign authors, Samuel Clemens conceded in testimony before a U.S. 
Senate committee on patents in 1886 that it was wrong to accuse American 
reprinters of dishonesty: 
I do consider that those persons who are called "pirates" ... were made 
pirate by the collusion of the United States Government ... Congress, if 
anybody, is to blame for their action. It is not dishonesty. They have that 
right, and they have been working under that right a long time, publish-
ing what is called "pirated books." They have invested their money in that 
way, and they did it in the confidence that they would be supported and 
no injustice done them. 31 
Clemens recognized, pragmatically, that the American publishing 
industry had grown up under conditions created by the copyright law 
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and that a dramatic change in the law would undoubtedly upset settled 
expectations. 
Like Clemens, British commentators sometimes took the position that 
American publishers should not be assailed for simply acting in conformity 
with the law of the land. The London publisher Grant Richards, charmed by 
Mosher's attractive and scholarly reprints, wrote, 
It is difficult to see why the word "pirate" should be used in any oppro-
brious sense, since all that he did was to avail himself of his legal rights. 
Besides, much of what Mosher printed was "chosen from scarce editions 
and from sources not generally knoWD,"while at all times he used material 
thatwas, according to the law ofhis country, within the public domain. 32 
The English writer Richard Le Gallienne went even further and declared 
that it seemed to him '"mere chUdishness •.• to complain if some one exer-
cises his undoubted legal right of taking a fancy to [an uncopyrighted work]. 
Actu~ I rejoice no little that so much exquisite literature would seem to 
have been thus left unprotected."» In essence, Richards and Le Gallienne, 
like Clemens, were insisting on the disambiguation of the term pirate, refus-
ing to impute ethical impropriety where no criminal or civilliabUity could 
be charged. The American cOpyright authority Eaton S. Drone summed up 
these exonerating distinctions in his 1879 treatise: 
In the law of copyright, piracy is the use ofliterary property in violation of 
the legal rights of the owner .... [I] t is not piracy to take without authority 
either a part or the whole of what another has written, if neither a stat-
ute nor the common law is thereby violated. ... Hence, there may be an 
unauthorized appropriation of literary property which is neither piracy 
nor plagiarism, as the republication in the United States of the work of a 
foreign author. This is not piracy, because no law is violated; and, without 
misrepresentation as to authorship, it is not plagiarism. 34 
Many American reprinters could not accurately be called pirates or plagia-
rists. Yet those who persisted in railing against pirate reprinters swept away 
such distinctions in their indignation. 'The rhetoric of piracy in the nine-
teenth century was burdened with the outrage of these moralists, and the 
system of trade courtesy added further lexical freight, as shown below. 
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Lawful American Book Piracy in the Nineteenth Century 
1hroughout the nineteenth century, protests against so-called Yankee pirates 
issued from both sides of the Atlantic. 3S By the 1830s, the practice of reprint-
ing British books and periodicals without permission had become wide-
spread in the American book trade. A decade earlier, the recently founded 
Harper publishing house in New York was ~ycompetingwith the Carey 
firm of Philadelphia for Guy Mannering, Kenilworth, '!he Pirate, and other 
popular novels by Sir Walter Scott. 36 'Ihe Harper editions of Scott's unpro-
tected novels sold in America for a fraction of the price charged in Britain 
and gained a wider readership than they enjoyed abroad.37 The reprinting 
of British titles was both a business and a'game, an exuberant scramble to 
exploit a large and utterly free resource.38 Over the years, many popular 
British writers were seized upon-Tennyson, Thackeray, the Brownings, 
George Eliot, Thomas Carlyle, Edward Bulwer-Lytton, and Wtlkie Collins, 
. to name just a few. 
Charles Dickens was a fiercely contested prize. Hundreds of thou-
sands of pirated copies of his works circulated in the United States.39 In 
the frenzied competition for new English fiction among the weekly and 
daily periodicals of the 1830s and 184Os, firms like Harpers that regarded 
themselves as Dickens's authorized publishers retaliated by issuing 
his novels in unbound parts at twelve-and-a-half cents and six cents.40 
In .1842, the year of his first American tour, Dickens denounced the 
"scoundrel-booksellers" who "grow rich [in the United States] from pub-
lishing books, the authors of which do not reap one farthing from their 
issue," along with the "vile, blackguard, and detestable newspaper[ s]" that 
also reprinted British writings without authorization or remuneration.41 
Writing to Dickens in the same year, Thomas Carlyle adopted decalogic 
tones to express his disgust with American pirates: "That thou belongest 
to a different 'Nation' and canst steal without being certainly hanged for 
it, gives thee no permission to steal. Thou shalt not in any wise steal at 
all! So it is written down for Nations and for Men, in the Law Book of the 
Maker of this Universe."41 
Carlyle was not the only author to appeal to God's law for the confounding 
of rascally reprinters. Later in the century, the American poet James Russell 
Lowell put his frustration with book piracy into a single uncompromising 
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quatrain, which became the motto of the American Copyright League and 
the chant of advocates of international copyright: 
In vain we caI1 old notions fudge, 
And bend our conscience to our dealing; 
The Ten Commandments will not budge, 
And stealing will continue stealing. 43 
Even Walt Whibnan, usually a lyrical advocate of the interests of American 
multitudes, lamented his compatriots' exploitation of British authors: 
Do not our publishers fatten quicker and deeper? (helping themselves, 
under shelter of a delusive and sneaking law, or rather absence oflaw, to 
most of their forage, poetical, pictorial, historical, roman~c, even comic, 
without money and without price-and fiercely resisting the timidest 
proposal to pay for it.)"" 
Like Henry Holt, Whitman trained his criticism on two targets, the "delu-
sive and sneaking law" and the publishers that gorged themselves on free 
literary "forage," without deciding which was the more culpable. 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, American publishers 
continued to be aggressive in reprinting popular British authors with-
out authorization and often without payment In the fierce competition 
for foreign titles in the 1880s,·which led to the overproduction of cheap 
paper-covered books and a ruinous glutting of the market, Robert Louis 
Stevenson's uncopyrighted works were widely reproduced, as were Mrs. 
Humphry Ward's Robert Elsmere and Rider Haggard's Cleopatra, the latter 
appearing in ten different editions. 45 When Holt published an authorized 
edition of The Mayor of Casterbrldge in 1886, he assured Thomas Hardy 
that although the market was overrun with pirates, "[w]e will do the best 
we can with it in these distressing times when it seems next to impossible 
to do anything with anything."46 Alexander Grosset brought out a string of 
unprotected works by Rudyard Kipling in 1899, including Barrack Room 
Ballads, Departmental Ditties, and Other Ballads and Verses; The Light That 
Failed; The City of Dreadful Night; Child Stories; The Vampirej and several of 
his popular poems done up as booklets selling for fifteen cents a copy. As 
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Grosset's partner George T. Dunlap later explained, the young firm justified 
this spate of titles on the seemingly paradoxical ground that these already 
uncopyrighted works had become a kind of "public property ..• having been 
reprinted indiscriminately by about everyone else in the business."47 
Oscar Wllde learned that he was the victim of American pirates while on 
his famous lecture tour of the United States in 1882. A 10 cent edition of 
his Poems, printed together with his lecture on the English Renaissance, had 
appeared in a pamphlet in George P. Munro's Seaside Library. Imitations of 
Munro's edition quickly appeared. Wllde complained to the American press 
that "in all your [railroad] cars I find newsmen selling my poems-stolen! 
I never can resist the impulse to read out a lesson on the heinousness of 
the offense." What concerned him most was that the piracies were eroding 
attendance at his lectures: "''The English Renaissance' is printed in the 'Sea 
Side:" he lamented, "so people think they know it and stay away."411 Yet the 
piracies also helped to spread Wllde's fame. He earned thousands of dollars 
as his share of the tour receipts.49 
W. B. Yeats, too, was pirated during his lecture tour of America in 1903-4. 
Mosher, who reprinted Yeats's The Land of Heart's Desire through several unau-
thorized editions, issued a 1903 text of the play in his Lyric Garland Series, for 
which he claimed to have had Yeats's consent 'The success of the Irish author's 
tour, which netted him over three thousand dollars, had been helped by the cir-
culation ofhis p~ though he apparently received no ex gratia payment from 
Moshe&50 Others pirated Yeats as well, at least through 1926: Walter H. Baker, 
'The 'Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 'The Little Leather Library Corp. of New York, 
and 'The Shrewsbury PubUshing Co.Sl 
Literary piracy in nineteenth-century America was a complex activity inti-
mately bound up with legitimate publishing and the cOpyright law. As one 
commentator put it in 1882, piracy was "the product oflaw."Sl Respectable 
houses and pirate firms were not always distinguishable. Just as the U.S. 
copyright acts of 1790, 1831, and 1870 openly encouraged the unauthor-
ized reprinting of fOreign authors, so reprinting was an enabling condition 
of much legitimate publishing in the United States. Not only did the low 
overhead of reprinting underwrite publishers' more expensive, author-
ized undertakings; promiscuous freebooting allowed many startup firms 
to acquire lists and capital that propelled them to power and respectability. 
'The profits from reprinting Kipling helped build the financial foundation of 
Grosset & Dunlap,S3 'The Harper firm, which came to dominate the American 
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Figure 1.2 Pirate reprint of Wilde's Poems, New York, Seaside library, 1882. 
(Courtesy Merlin Holland] 
publishing scene, was well known for its early piratical aggressions, selling 
British reprints at much lower prices than in England, where lending librar-
ies depressed sales and raised prices.54 As McGill has shown, a decentralized 
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reprint industry in the antebellum years reflected the republican ideals of 
cultural diffusion and widespread learning, fostering a depersonalized print 
culture at the expense of individual authors' rights.55 Legislators built piracy 
into the copyright law as a way of accommodating the democratic values of 
"ready access to literature, information, education, and other conduits for 
achieving equality of opportunity."S6 
Much later in the century, the energetic New York publisher John 
W. Lovell, who had openly defied trade courtesy and become known as 
"Book-A-Day Lovell" for the millions of inexpensive copies he issued each 
year, formed a "book trust" of cheap reprinters, called the United States 
Book Co., with the objective of establishing uniform prices and discounts 
and stabilizing the chaotic competition in cheap fomgn reprints.S7 1he 
Lovell book trust thus sought to accomplish by overt cartel behavior 
what trade courtesy had achieved through less formal methods. Indeed, 
so destructive had the competition in cheap reprints become during the 
1880s that Lovell and others briefly tried to carry on a kind of trade cour-
tesy among themselves, paying honoraria to foreign authors and royalties 
on copyrighted American works. Although the book trust was short-lived, 
The Publishers' Weekly wrote, 
From a ·predatory" beginning-in this respect not much unlike many 
who consider themselves their betters-the Lovells have gradually 
worked their way up from indifferently-made to better-made novels; from 
pirated work to books published by arrangement with foreign authors 
and publishers, and to American copyright literature. 58 
Once established, Lovell-in this respect like Mosher-adopted the graces 
of the courtesy publishers, entering into agreements with foreign authors, 
obtaining advance sheets, and paying honoraria. Lovell's uninhibited publi-
cation of cheap books in his salad days, called piracy by established publish-
ers, had laid the foundation for his later prosperity and ambitions. 
Piracy was more than an enabling condition of legitimate publishing, 
however; it was also a necessary condition of American literary culture in 
the nineteenth century. 1hroughout much of the century, the United States 
was a net importer of works offiction, and British books were eagerly sought 
by an increasingly literate populace.59 Publishers and book manufacturers 
depended on a flow of production that might be impeded "unless there was 
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a reservoir of English works to draw upon when the American streams ran 
dry."60 According to David Saunders, the Harper firm's first catalogue con-
tained 234 titles of which ninety percent were English reprints, "the same 
pattern being true for W"uey and for Putnam."61 Prior to the Civil War, approx-
imately fifty percent of all fiction best sellers in America were unauthorized 
foreign works. Q 'The Report of the 1876-78 Royal British Commission on 
Copyrights observed, G[T]he original works published inAmerica are, as yet, 
less numerous than those published in Great Britain. '!his naturally affords 
a temptation to the Americans to take advantage of the works of the older 
country, and at the same time tends to diminish the inducement to publish 
original works. "63 'The commission was especially concerned that American. 
publishers were able to issue British books "at cheap rates to a population of 
forty millions, perhaps the most active readers in the world."64 
'The cheap libraries launched by American publishers in the 1880s give an 
idea of the dominance of British fiction in the United States only a few years 
before Congress enacted international copyright reform. Brander Matthews, 
a strong proponent of copyright ·protection for fOreign authors, reported 
that of the fifty-four numbers of Harper & Brothers' Franklin Square Library 
published in 1886, only one was by an American author. Forty-six of the 
fifty-three foreign-authored numbers were works of fiction. Of the sixty-two 
numbers issued in Harpers Handy Series in the same year, fifty-eightwere by 
foreign authors, and fifty-two of these were fiction. 6S Volumes in these series 
sold for twenty or twenty-five cents each.66 Observing that books published 
in the United States on other subjects, such as law, science, and theology, 
were mostly authored by Americans and were therefore protected by copy-
right, Matthews concluded that passage of a reform bill would "remove the 
premium of cheapness which now serves to make the American public take 
imported novels instead of native wares" and would reduce the "well-nigh 
exclusive diet of English fiction full of the feudal ideas and superstitions and 
survivals of which we have been striving for a century to rid ourselves."67 
During the late 1880s, the popularity of foreign novels noticeably declined, 
and the number of COpyrighted American books spiked, due in part to a 
change in popular taste and to the poor quality offoreign reprints. 68 But even 
after Congress added international cOpyright protections in 1891, fiction by 
. foreign authors remained a powerful presence. In 1895, foreign authors still 
accounted for eight of the top ten best sellers in the United States, though this 
changed by 1910, when nine of the top ten were authored by Americans.69 
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The Cultural Commons and the Public Goods Problem 
The 1790 copyright act was captioned ~ act for the encouragement of 
learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors 
and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned. "70 The 
statute's grant offederal copyrights aimed to stimulate American authorship, 
while its creation of a cOpyright vacuum for foreign authors no less clearly 
benefited American publishers, printers, and book manufacturers, together 
with readers who could purchase foreign works at a fraction of the original 
cost. Both of these congressional fiats-the giving and the withholding of 
copyright protection-encouraged learning in the United States, the first 
by offering a stimulus to creativity, the second by providing incentives and 
windfalls to the reprint trade. These two &ces of copyright lawwere defining 
features of the American public domain from its inception. 
Although meanings of the term vary, the public domain may be defined, 
for present purposes, as the common pool of works that are not protected 
by copyright in a given country, either because they were created before 
the advent of copyright laws or because the copyrights they once enjoyed 
have naturally expired or because they have prematurely forfeited or do 
not qualify for copyright protection. 'Ihe 1790 act and subsequent acts 
of Congress primarily drew upon two of these approaches for creating 
the American public domain. The first was to grant to American authors 
copyrights that would eventually expire. Under the 1790 act, federal 
copyrights in works by U.S. citizens and residents endured for a maximum 
of twenty-eight years from the recording of the work's title in a district 
court.71 (Later enactments increased this term.) The second approach was 
expressly to deny copyrights to foreign-authored works from their incep-
tion; these works lacked copyright protection whether they were "written, 
printed, or published. "12 Thus, the American public domain was, from the 
beginning, a two-tiered resource conSisting largely of expired copyrights 
and withheld copyrights. 
Economists and legal scholars refer to intangible, infinitely reproduc-
ible things, such as works of authorship, as public goods. Other examples 
of public goods are air, fireworks, lighthouses, and national defense; as 
with authors' writings, the benefits offered by these things can be shared 
by many persons without being depleted. By their nature, public goods are 
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nonexcludable and nonrivalrous-that is, theY cannot be fenced off in the 
manner of private property, and one person's consumption of a public good 
does not prevent a second person from consuming the same good. Paul A. 
Samuelson classically defined public goods as "collective consumption goods 
... which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individuals consump-
tion of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's 
consumption of that good. "'73 Wendy J. Gordon has noted that intangible 
works of authorship are public goods that are "susceptible to freeriding, and 
thus difficult to produce in a normal competitive market "74 A public goods 
problem arises when free riding becomes so prevalent that the producer of 
the good loses the incentive to continue to produce it-a consequence that 
eco'iitmists refer to as a type of market failure. In recent years, the recording 
industry has frequently raised the specter of market failure by warning that 
if unlawful online file sharing continues unchecked, musicians and record 
companies will simply cease creating and recording music; they will have 
no incentive to continue producing what they cannot control Intellectual 
property laws can be viewed as attempts to prevent market failure by placing 
an invisible legal fence around the intrinsically open and unbounded public 
good of authorship.7s 
To the extent that nineteenth-century authors may be said to have pro-
duced public goods, unauthorized reprinting of their writings may be 
viewed as a vast free rider problem (or an easy rider problem, since reprint-
ing inVolved printing costs and other overhead). But if reprinters free rode 
so heavily on foreign authors, why did those authors continue to write and 
publish? In part because the copyrightlaws of their own countries solved free 
rider problems for their publishing markets, allowing them to capture the 
domestic benefits of their labors. Although free or easy riding was rampant 
in the United States, foreign authors could live with those losses. They might 
hope for ex gratia payments from American publishers and complain bit-
terly about scoundrel reprinters, but American piracies did not undermine 
their incentives to create so long as they could look to their own markets for 
remuneration. Such an arrangement was irresistible to American publishers: 
they had access to a free, valuable, and continuously replenished resource 
that no amount of explOitation could noticeably deplete. The American 
public domain was parasitic in this regard; it annexed a vast free resource of 
foreign innovation without running the risk of losing that resource through 
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failure to incentivize it. With respect to the creation of fOreign works, the 
public domain was not haunted by the public goods problem. 
But publishers, too, are producers; like authors, they require economic 
incentives to go on producing. Why would a publishing firm in New York 
invest in advance sheets of a Dickens novel when a firm across town or in 
Philadelphia could free or easy ride by bringing out a competing edition 
within a few days? '!he publishing industry faced this public goods prob-
lem throughout the nineteenth century; reprinting spawned reprinting, 
and publishers had no more legal recourse against each other than for-
eign authors had against them. Why, then, did the threat of uncontrolled 
reprinting not result in widespread market failure within the American 
publishing industry and the early abandonment of foreign literature as a 
profitable good? 
'!his question was of critical importance to publishers. What the commons 
gave them, the commons might easily take away by eroding their incentives 
to go to the expense of reprinting foreign works. Competing editions of the 
same uncopyrighted work might result in ruinous price-cutting that would 
drive revenues down below the point at which a reasonable profit could be 
extracted. Unrestrained predatory pricing of cheap reprints threatened to 
tear the American publishing industry apart in the 184Os, and it resulted in 
a sharp decline in the reprinting of foreign works in the late 1880s.76 How 
could publishers regulate this resource so as to make it a paying commons? 
'!he answer, intricately and ingeniously evolved over the nineteenth century, 
was the courtesy of the trade. 
Regulating the Cultural Commons: The Law of Courtesy 
Looking back over forty years of American publishing, Henry Holt in 
1893 laconically defined the courtesy of the trade as the duty "[nJot to 
jump another publisher's claim."77 A few years earlier, he had been more 
expansive. "[T]here grew up," he wrote, "between, say, 1850 and 1876, the 
unwritten law ••• of 'trade courtesy: It not only prevented ruinous compe-
tition between ~erican publishers, but also secured to foreign authors 
most of their rights."78 Trade courtesy, in its fully developed form, thus had 
a horizontal and a vertical axis. By requiring participating publishers to 
respect the claim of the first publisher to announce its intention to reprint 
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a foreign title, courtesy horizontally regulated what might otherwise h;we 
disintegrated into destructive competition for the new foreign work. Holt 
acknowledged that this aspect of the courtesy system was "simply the result 
of an enlightened self-interest "19 Vertically, the system ordered relations 
between American publishers and foreign authors by encouraging pay-
ments to the authors or their publishers. Again, self-interest was at work. 
Payments helped cement relationships with foreign authors and Signaled 
to other publishers that the paying firm was a responsible member of the 
trade. What is most immediately striking about trade courtesy is that it was 
an unwritten law, an entirely voluntary system of informal norms that mim-
icke~ the basic features and purposes of copyright law. Courtesy evolved 
a coDlplex set of exclusive rights, rules for securing those rights, and sanc-
tions for violating them. 'These synthetic rights helped to regulate the 
American public domain and stabilize the book market during much of the 
nineteenth century. 
Holt praised trade courtesy as a system that grew to possess "the essen-
tial features of an International COpyright Law," despite the '"gaps and 
defects" that were typical of-all usages, and for that matter ... alllaws."so A 
few years earlier, the Harper firm had acknowledged that courtesy "has ena-
bled American publishers to grant to foreign authors many of the benefits 
which would accrue to them under the operation of a copyright treaty;"'1 In 
1855, the Board of Music Trade of the United States of America, which had 
been established to bring order to the volatile American market for sheet 
musiC; Organized a form of courtesy by which music publishers agreed 
to refrain from reprinting uncopyrighted music that had previously been 
issued by a participating publisher. 'This practice, observed the New-York 
Musical Review and Gazette, "is supposed to place copyright, or American 
compositioDS, on an equal business footing with non-copyright, or foreign 
compositions, inasmuch as the latter will hereafter have but one publisher 
instead of half a dozen or more, as formerly."111 Trade courtesy encowaged 
participants to treat publishers' prior claims to foreign works as a kind of 
virtual property, on the basis of which firms could invest in the production 
of books and music, make contracts with authors and with each other, and 
transfer "rights" in the works to which they held courtesy title. 'The practice 
bridged the protection gap created by U.S. copyright law, but no American 
court ever treated these norms as actual legal entitlements. A court in 1865 
noted that the system 
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confessedly rests upon no common law of the coun~ recognized and 
administered by judicial tribunals. !fit has any foundation at all, it stands 
on the mere will, or .,. the "courtesy" of the trade. ... It can, therefore, 
hardly be called property at all-certainly not in any sense known to the 
Iaw.83 
Yet within the charmed circle of participants, the courtesy claim of one 
publisher, if properly secured, was recognized as a kind of property. Some 
scholars trace the origins of American trade courtesy to the self-regulating 
practices oflrish publishers prior to the extension of English copyright law 
to Ireland in 1801.84 Similar norms-based observances are known to'-have 
existed in Scotland in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries before 
English works were protected by copyright there. as Even in England, reg-
ulated cartels, referred to as printing congers, arose to protect publishers' 
vested interests in uncopyrighted works by Shakespeare, Henry Fielding, 
Samuel Johnson, and other authors.86 After the enactment of the Statute of 
Anne in 1709, which conferred limited statutory terms of copyright, some 
English publishers continued to trade and hold shares in perpetual common 
law copyrights, as if these had never been abolished by Parliament's enact-
ment 87 Other publishers were permitted, by courtesy, to ignore the expira-
tion of a work's copyright after its statutory tenn and to continue to print 
the book as their exclusive property.88 Well into the nineteenth century a 
few English publishers observed a kind of courtesy with respect to books 
by American authors, though the system was not as cohesive and efficient 
as its American counterpart, and American books that had been paid for by 
one English publisher were, "in a large number of cases, promptly reissued 
in cheaper rival editions by other houses. "89 A common feature of all these 
extralegal practices is that they took place within close-knit communities 
that shared economic interests. 
Scholars in various disciplines have noted that informal, norms-based 
conservation of COmmon resources has succeeded best within relatively 
small, cohesive groups. 90 Notable examples include the norms and sanctions 
that have evolved within the community of Maine lobstennen-particularly 
the lobstermen of Matinicus Island, twenty miles off Maine-to preserve 
customary trapping boundaries. Local customs and practices, not law, have 
fixed the areas where lobster traps may be employed as well as the number 
of traps that may be set. Lobstennen's informal rules range from cutting 
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trap lines on traps set by unauthorized outsiders to notching the tails of 
egg-bearing female lobsters in order to conserve the lobster populatiOn.91 
Today, as in nineteenth-century America, informal norms operate within 
certain defined communities to fill lacunae within intellectual property laws. 
For example, the lack of copyright protection for chefs' recipes and prep-
arations has given rise to a collection of social norms within the culinary 
industry. These informal rules are uniform and strictly observed: a chef must 
not copy another chef's recipe exactly; if a chef reveals a secret recipe to a 
colleague, that colleague must not pass the secret on to others without per-
missionj and chefs must give credit to the developers of significant recipes 
or techniques. 91 Stand-up comedy is another area in which scholarship has 
unearthed a community governed by informal rules. Here, social norms-
including rules for establishing the priority of gags, prohibitions on copying 
premises and punch-lines, and shaming sanctions for violators-have taken 
the place of formal, enforceable laws.93 Fashion design is yet another indus-
try that has evolved an informal, norms-based system of entitlements and 
sanctions.94 
In each of these industries-culinary art, stand-up comedy, and fashion 
design-the absence or inadequacy of legal protections has stimulated a 
close-knit community to establish a framework of informal rules and pun-
ishments that allows the community to police itself and to manage an essen-
tially free, common-pool resource of intangible, easily copied creations. This 
is precisely what American publishers did in the nineteenth century when 
they developed the consensual system of trade courtesy. The community of 
participating publishers was a small, cohesive one. Although estimates vary, 
the extant correspondence of Charles Scribner's Sons reveals that at least 
nine major publishing firms, in addition to Scribner's, observed the prin-
ciples of courtesy during the 1870s:]. B. Lippincott & Co.,]. R. Osgood & 
Co., D. Appleton & Co., Roberts Brothers, G. P. Putnam's Sons, Harper & 
Brothers, MacmjIJan & Co., E. P. Dutton & Co., and Henry Holt & Co.9S 
Although other publishing houses dabbled in courtesy-Mosher, for exam-
ple, employed some ofits rules, as did certain cheap reprint houses during 
the chaotic competition of the 1880s-some firms did not. Novice publish-
ers and small firms had strong incentives to resist the gentlemanly code and 
to reprint freely as a way of establishing book lists, and courtesy failed to 
gain a foothold in the aggressive cheap paper-book trade of the 1870s and 
18805. 
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'The practice of courtesy is a vivid example of what Robert C. Ellickson 
has called "order without law," a system of folkways peculiar to a close-knit 
group or community in which informal norms have come to take the place of 
formal legal rules. Ellickson has argued that "[m]uch of the glue of a society 
comes not from law enforcement ..• but rather from the informal enforce-
ment of social-mores by acquaintances, bystanders, trading partners, and oth-
ers."96 In rewarding conformity and punishing deviancy, Amencan publishers 
employed the carrots and sticks ofElIickson's taxpnomy of remedial norms. 
As "unofficial enforcers," they used "punishments such as negative gossip and 
ostracism to discipline malefactors and bounties such as esteem and enhanced 
trading opportunities to reward the worthy."97 ElIickson grounds his conclu-
sions in an empirical study of the norms used for dealing with animal tres-
pass in rural Shasta County, Californiaj "trespass conflicts," writes Ellickson, 
"are generally resolved not 'in the shadow of the law' but, rather, beyond that 
shadow. Most rural residents are consciously committed to an overarching 
norm of cooperation among neighbors:'98 Other scholars have explored the 
informal norms operating, for example, in the American cotton industry, the 
grain and feed industry, and the diamond trade in New York. 99 
Of course, the publishing world in the nineteenth century; though cohe-
sive enough to evolve an extralegal code of conduct, was more heterogene-
ous and volatile than the elose-lmit rural community: of Ellickson~ study. 
And, unlike his resourceful cattlemen who employ flexible social mores as 
an alternative to unwieldy or unfamiliar legal remedies, American publishers 
did not have the luxury of choosing between informal norms and legal enti-
tlements, since the foreign authors whom they reprinted enjoyed no legal 
entitlements at all in the United States. '!hese publishers were confronted 
instead with a starker choice between informal self-regulation and no regu-
lation at all. '!he choice was not between order with law and order with-
out law, but, more fundamen~ between order and chaos. Anticipating 
Ellickson by eighty years, Henry Holt; a proud chronicler of courtesy, 
described it as "a brief realization of the ideals of philosophical anarchism-
self-regulation without law."lDO Operating beyond the shadow of the law-
indeed, in its absence-publishers sought to avert destructive competition 
by evolving informal modes of cooperating to manage a free, unprotecte~ 
resource. With striking though intermittent success over the decades, the 
elaborate rules of courtesy staved off a public goods problem and a ruinous 
overuse of the commons of foreign works. 
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Trade Courtesy: Entitlements 
In its simplest outlines, the courtesy of the trade granted an informal exclu-
sive right of publication to the firstAmerican publisher to announce plans to 
issue an uncopyrighted foreign book. Participating houses recognized this 
right and refrained from what they called "printing on" the announcing firm. 
Later, in order to ensure official notice, publishers agreed among themselves 
that the announcement had to be made in some recognized medium, and 
the New York Commercial Advertiser became the primary organ for "in press" 
announcements. 'Ihe Publishers' Weekly, The Weekly Trade Circular, and other 
organs reprinted the Commercial Advertiser's announcements of forthcom-
ing foreign books. Eager publishers began to exploit this notice mechanism, 
however, by announcing any title that seemed promising, whether it was 
actually in hand or only contemplated To remedy such "courtesy creep,"lOl 
which was leading to simultaneous announcements and confusion over pri-
ority, the rule emerged that the announcing firm, to secure its rights, must 
actually have purchased advance sheets of the foreign edition for use as set-
ting copy or have entered into an agreement with the author for permis-
sion to reprint "If a publisher had the advance sheets in his possession, such 
right or claim overrode a simple announcement"lDl By supplementing its 
announcement with the purchase of advance sheets or an authors contract, 
the publisher perfected its otherwise bare title to the foreign work. 
The rules of courtesy reCOgnized fastidious distinctions. The mere pur-
chase of copies of a foreign edition did not secure an exclusive right to the 
American market; there was a difference between setting up an edition from 
advance sheets and importing books from abroad.103 A firm looked more 
like a distributor than a publisher when it simply purchased premanufac-
tured copies. No Locke-like property entitlements could be claimed by 
those who performed no real labor in the commons.104 The perfection of 
courtesy rights did not always require the purchase of advance sheets, but 
some affirmative act beyond mere announcement had to be performed. 
Only when an American publisher decided to take the risk of publishing a 
new or unknown foreign author was it permissible to rely on announcement 
alone; in such cases, other houses respected the publisher's willingness to try 
its luck with an uncertain prospect Books by anew and uncertain authors; 
explained Holt, aare a field for experiment, and if a publisher concluded that 
one was worth experimenting with, though not worth paying for in advance 
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of experiment, the rights from first announcement were intended to secure 
him the fruits of his experiment, if successfuL"lOS Here, risk and adventure 
played the role that honoraria and author agreements ordinarily played in 
securing courtesy title. A further advantage was that the experimenting firm 
might obtain a right to the author's future books.106 Simultaneous announce-
ments in such cases were settled by arrangement between the competing 
houses. 
Trade courtesy also developed a kind of option system, based on what 
the trade referred to as the rule of association. Once an American pub-
lisher reprinted a foreign title and paid its author, it was generally under-
stood that the author was associated with that house, which could then 
expect to have the first refusal of the author's next effort. For example, after 
William D. TIcknor built a claim to Tennyson's Poems in 1842, other pub-
lishers respected the Boston firm's right to publish Tennyson's laterworks.107 
Houses that observed trade courtesy usually resisted the temptation to 
interfere with other houses' associations. TIcknor & Fields, the author-
ized American publisher of Robert Browning, would gladly have added 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning to its list but recognized the superior claim of 
her New York publisher, c. S. Francis & Co. Reluctant to meddle with a 
prior claim, TIcknor & Fields wryly remarked to Robert Browning, "We are 
a funny set of christians over the waves."l08 Joseph Henry Harper recalled 
publishers' punctilio in matters of association: "An offer received by a pub-
lisher from an author already identified with another house was by courtesy 
first submitted to the house which had already published the author's works, 
and publishers abstained from entering into competition for books which 
were recognized as the special province of another house."lD9 '!here were 
additional refinements. For example, if a publisher reprinted the work of an 
untried author as an experiment, the publisher would have the refusal of the 
author's later books only if it made satisfactory payment to the author for 
the first publication. 110 
With variations, the foregOing rules evolved over time into a coherent 
and elaborate system of informal property norms. Holt noted the sys-
tem's law-like imbrication of rules and subrules: "Trade courtesy is as full 
of exceptions as the law itself It has grown up as a mass of decisions in 
particular cases, just as the common law has."111 Fully developed, courtesy 
provided bright-line rules for securing title to foreign works by announce-
ment; a method for recording claims in a reCOgnized public medium, so 
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that disputes over priority could be settled objectively; a basis for making 
payments to foreign authors or their publishers; and further rules for asso-
ciating an author with a house by obtaining an option on his or her future 
work. As publishers recognized, this system imitated the broad features of 
copyright law: acquisition of exclusive publishing rights, registration of 
rights with a public authority, and payment of outright sums or royalties to 
copyright owners. 
Publishers sometimes paid handsome, even extraordinary, sums for 
advance sheets of popular books. As early as the 1820s and 18305, the 
Philadelphia firm of Carey & Lea was making payments to Sir Walter 
SCQtt or his publisher.1l1 Scott received £75 for advanee sheets of each 
of the Waverley novels and £300 for his Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. l13 
In 1835, Harper & Brothers paid Bulwer-Lytton for early proofs "at the 
rate of £50 per volume of a new English novel, or £150 for the usual 
'three decker."·u4 In 1849, the Harpers brought out Thomas Babington -
Macaulay's famous History of England, from the Accession of James II after 
announcing the book and paying his English publisher £200 for first 
proofs. us The Harpers paid Charles Dickens £360 for Bleak House, £250 
for Little Dorrit, £1,000 each for A Tale of Two Cities and Our Mutual 
Friend, £1,250 for Great Expectations, and £2,000 for the never-finished 
Mystery of Edwin Drood. U6 Until fierce competition from cheap reprints 
made it difficult to pay honoraria in the 1880s, the Appleton firm paid the 
Welsh author Rhoda Broughton a thousand dollars for each of her nov-
els.1l7Writing to the Scottish novelist Mrs. Oliphant in 1873, the Harpers 
described the courtesy practice of purchasing advance sheets from for-
eign authors or their agents or publishers: 
In the absence of an international copyright, it is the custom for an English 
author, or his agent in London, to send early sheets to some American 
publisher, fixing a price therefor,-and by a law of courtesy the American 
publisher who has issued the previous works of an author is entitled to 
the first consideration of that author's new book. If such publisher cannot 
arrange satisfactorily and upon reasonable terms for the book, obviously 
he cannot object to its offer to some ofhis neighbors. In many cases when 
the English authors send us early sheets of their books, and for some rea-
son we fail to use them, we endeavor to sell them on the author's account 
to other American houses.u8 
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The Harpers here touched on a further way in which courtesy approximated 
principles of copyright law: a publisher, once it had acquired courtesy title, 
enjoyed the power to transfer it. 
Publishers frequently issued announcements that skillfully combined 
in press notices with advertising, thereby addressing fellow publishers and 
book buyers at the same time. In 1841, the publishers of the New York peri-
odical lhe New World had "the pleasure to announce that they have pur-
chased at great expense, the advance proof-sheets of the new Swedish novel 
by Frederika Bremer, translated by Mary Howitt, entitled The Home: or, 
Family Cares and Family J015."119 Harper's New Monthly Magazine in 1855 
printed a notice stating that "Harper and Brothers have in press and will pub-
lish, from advance sheets; works by Sir Walter Scott, Anne Marsh-Caldwell, 
James Silk Buckingham, and Lady Holland.120 In 1872, a prominent notice 
for Harper's Periodicals in the Boston monthly lheLiterary World stated that 
the firm had "secured the plates and advance sheets of'London: A Pilgrimage,' 
by Gustave Dore and Blanchard Jerrold, anew and magnificent series ofmus-
trations from the pencil of the great French artist."lll In 1880, lhe Literary 
News announced that a "new novel by Rhoda Broughton, entitled 'Second 
Thoughts, will be published by D. Appleton and Co. from advance sheets."l2.2. 
Publishers were at pains to stress that they paid their foreign authors, as in 
1882 whenJ. B. Lippincott & Co. wrote the editors oflhe Critic that 
when what are known as the "trade courtesy rules" (still in force with all 
reputable publishers, but ignored by the "pirates") gave the authorized 
American publisher some protection in his ventures, we were enabled to 
pay large sums for the advance sheets of foreign books. For instance, we 
paid Ouida £300 for each of her novels, and we have paid as much for 
some of Geo. MacDonald's books, and ofBulwer's.l2.3 
Publishers in their advertisements and notices often emphasized the sum 
they had paid fOreign authors. The mention of advance sheets or payment 
secured a publisher's courtesy title and Signaled to other houses and to the 
public that the publisher was a reliable, rule-abiding firm. 
Instead of paying up-front sums for advance sheets, publishing houses 
sometimes paid post hoc honoraria to authors whose books had made a 
success. Such after-the-fact gratuities were occasionally rejected, as when 
Lang rebuffed Mosher's suggestion of a "solatium." In other cases, authors 
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welcomed honoraria as better than nothing. In 18361 the Carey firm of 
Philadelphia reprinted Pickwick Papers in an edition of fifteen hundred 
copiesl sold at forty-five cents per volume. Two years iaterl the firm sent 
.' . . .... 
Dickens £50 in acknowledgment of the book's success.l14 George Haven 
Putnam observed, "[T]he author with no legal rights was thankful to get ten 
, pounds when he could not get fifty and was very ready in receiving fifty to 
give a full quittance of any claim on the general proceeds;"llS Of course, the 
only so-called claim a foreign author might have was on the conscience and 
respectability of the reprinter. Legal claim there was none. 
Later in the century, instead of honoraria for· successful sales or initial 
payments for advance sheets, publishers began to offer foreign authors roy-
alties on copies sold.l26 Sometimes authors would receive a smaDer" initial 
sum followed by a royalty on sales. If sales were insufficient to cover the pub-
lisher's costsl it was considered ethical to pay no royalty at all.127 In 1867, the 
Boston publisher James T. Fields made Charles Dickens the unusual offer 
of a ten percent royalty on books and an arranged speaking tour if the cel-
ebrated author would make the firm his authorized American publisher.l28 
Holt published numerous editions of Thomas Hardy's works in the 18705 
and 1880s-several in the Leisure Hour Series-and paid ten percent royal-
ties until widespread piracies made reprinting Hardy unprofitable. 129 In the 
1870S1 the Appleton firm arranged for royalty payments for the writings of 
the English novelist Charlotte M. Yonge. Againl courtesy imitated the for-
mal cqpyright law: royalties were the usual form of payment to authors who 
controlled the exclusive rights conferred by copyright. 
One of the benefits of association was that a firm could boast of being 
the authorized publisher of a foreign author. Such a relationship conferred 
respectability on the firml lifting it up out of the mass of mere pirates and 
indicating to other publishers and to the purchasing public that the firm 
enjoyed the prestige of honorable dealings. Publishers frequently included 
letters or statements of authorization in their editions of foreign authors' 
works. A letter by Robert Browning appeared in Ticknor & Fields' edition 
of his Dramatis Personael published in 1864. "I take advantage;' he wrotel 
"of the opportunity of publication in the United States of my Poems, for 
printing which you have liberally remunerated me, to express my earnest 
desire that the power of publishing in America this and every subsequent 
work of mine may rest exclusively with your hOUSe."l30 In a single sentencel 
Browning assured readers that he had been paid by nclmor & Fields and 
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that he favored that house as the one with which he wished to be associated 
in the United States. 
Ticknor & Fields' editions of'Ihomas De Quincey's writings reproduced 
a letter in which De Quincey authorized publication '"exclusively" and 
acknowledged that the publisher had '"made me a participator in the pecuni-
ary profits of the American edition, without solicitation or the shadow of 
any expectation on my part, without any legal claim that I could plead, or 
equitable warrant in established usage, solely and merely upon your own 
spontaneous motion."131 Similarly, in its 1891 edition of Rudyard Kipling's 
Mine Own People, the United States Book Co. included a facsimile letter in 
which the author affirmed that the edition '"has my authority" and that he 
owed "to the courtesy of my American publishers that I have had the oppor-
tunity of myself preparing the present book."1l2 '!he courtesy tradition of the 
authorization letter was a crucial component of Bennett Cerf's strategy for 
publishing James Joyce's Ulysses in America in the 1930s, as later chapters 
will show. 
Trade Courtesy: Punishments 
Henry Holt, the most eloquent and persistent defender of trade courtesy, 
thought of it as a golden age of American publishing. 'The publishers who 
practiced courtesy, he averred, were inherently honest. For him, courtesy 
was less a system that publishers had forged for regulating their own cupidity 
than an expression of honor among better businessmen. None of the major 
publishers-Putnam, Appleton, Harper, Scribner-"would go for another's 
author any more than for his watch; or, if he had got entangled with anoth-
er's author through some periodical or other outside right, would no more 
hold on to him than to the watch if the guard had got caught on a button. Dill 
With more ambivalence, Holt described nineteenth-century American pub-
lishing as "perhaps the greatest paradox in human expedence. •.. At one end, 
its principal material was not protected by law, and the business lived to a 
large extent on what was morally, if not legally, thievery; while at the other 
end, there was honor among thieves, in the respect they paid each other's 
property."I34 Holt's paradox operated on severa1levels: American cOpyright 
law made pirates of honest men, so they banded together to act honorably 
according to voluntary norms of fairness that took the place of law. '!he 
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"principal material" available to these businesses was a commons decreed by 
statute, yet it was a commons that publishers agreed to divide up and recog-
nize as "each other's property." Here, thieves who were only acting as the law 
had bidden agreed to acknowledge property rights in a free resource. '!his 
unusual enclosure movement succeeded for much of the century in averting 
a aisis of the cultural commons. 
Holt may have believed that courtesy was an embodiment of business 
virtue, but the courtesy system itself did not share the assumption that pub-
lishers, left to their own devices, would be good. Instead, along with rules for 
acquiring and maintaining exclusive rights, trade courtesy evolved a series 
of carefully calibrated penalties for transgressors. If informal exclusive rights 
to foreign titles were the carrots of the system, escalating sanctions were the 
sticks. These sanctions included, in order of increasing severity, mild remon-
strance, angry protest, public shaming, refusal to deal, predatory pricing, 
and outright retaliation. 
A gentlemanly rebuke, often expressed as a simple urbane inquiry; was 
the first step in enforcing exclusive courtesy rights. Holt and his associate 
Joseph Vogelius were quick to assert priority of claims. When the Harpers 
announced plans to reprint Hippolyte Taine's On Intelligence in 1870, Holt 
wrote the firm, "Doesn't the fact that we have published several ofhis books 
entitle us to that ifwe want it?"llS The Harpers agreed to with~ acknowl-
edging the rule of association whereby a publisher that had issued an 
author's earlier work was entitled to his or her later books. Four years later, 
Holt calmly objected when the Harpers planned to publish The Return of 
the Native, remindingJoseph Harper that Holt had been Hardy's authorized 
publisher in America. Harper again relented, and Holt later remarked that 
Harper had done "what the notions of honor then prevalent among publish-
ers of standing required.DIu 
Mild remonstrance became angry protest when a threat to courtesy per-
s~d.Aheated dispute arose between the Harper and Scribner firms in 1881 
over James Anthony Froude's edition of Thomas Carlyle's Reminiscences. 'The 
Harpers claimed an arrangement with the late Carlyle himself; Scribner's 
insisted that Froude was its author and that, as Carlyle's executor, he had 
authorized the Scribner firm to publish the work. After bitter exchanges, 
the two houses issued their respective editions and then took to the trade 
journals. 137 'The Harpers placed a full-page notice in The Publishers' Weekly, 
listing the works by Carlyle that they published and detailing the history of 
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their dealings with Carlyle for Reminiscences. The Harpers reminded readers 
of the courtesy of the trade: 
The trade usage is familiar, and accepted by all the leading publishers of 
the country. It concedes to the house which has issued the works of an 
English author, either by agreement with him or with his English pub-
lishers, the option of republishing, upon mutually satisfactory terms, the 
subsequent works of the same author as they appear.U8 
The Scribner firm's reprinting of Reminiscences, charged the Harpers, "is a 
violation of our claim." Scribner's responded the following week with its 
own full-page notice in The Publishers' Weekly, pointing to arrangements with 
Froude and Carlyle's niece and noting that the firm had received advance 
sheets from Froude and had duly announced that the volume was in press. 
Invoking trade courtesy by name, Scribner's concluded, "The public will 
choose between this edition, put forth by the clearly expressed authority of 
Mr. Carlyle~ executor, and a reprint from our sheets under a claim to which 
he has distinctly refused his acknowledgment."I39 
These public accusations were examples of a further courtesy sanction. 
Because private remonstrance had failed, the two houses resorted to the 
more severe punishment of public shaming, trading charges that their cour-
tesy claims had been violated. The Boston firm of Roberts Brothers had used 
the same tactic a year earlier when John W. Lovell of New York brought out 
an edition of the poems of Jean Ingelow, an English writer who had been 
associated with Roberts Brothers for years. 1he Boston firm promptly took 
out advertisements to "Booksellers throughout the United States," remind-
ing them that Roberts Brothers had been publishing Ingelow's poems ever 
since announcing the volume as in press in 1863 and that she had "received 
from us her copyright [that is, her royalty payment] semi-annually, precisely 
the same as though she were legally entitled to it." Not until now had anyone 
in "the entire fraternity of American Book Publishers" tried to "interfere." 
Roberts Brothers implored booksellers not to "sanction a moral wrong by 
vending this unauthorized version" but, rather, to "show their admiration 
for this beloved authoress by favoring only the Author's Editions, issued by 
her own publishers."l40 By broadcasting its disgust, Roberts Brothers had 
subjected the transgressor Lovell-whom they never needed to name in the 
notice-to public shaming. 
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A common form of shaming was to denounce an unauthorized publisher 
as a pirate. At the trial of a libel action brought by the publisher Isaac K. 
Funk against The New York Evening Post for having charged him with pirat-
ing the uncopyrighted Encyclopedia Britannica, Holt testified that "in the 
trade the words 'pirate' and 'thief' are £reely applied to those who reprint 
books already equitably in the hands of other publishers, and that the effect 
of such reprinting by Dr. Funk was 'not favorable' to his reputation in the 
trade."!41 George Haven Putnam testified at the same proceeding that words 
like pirate had "been applied to appropriations of works offoreign authors, 
and were used by authors like Lowell and Stedman as well as publishers."l41 
In charging the jury, the judge explained that if the Post had used "pirate" 
and "theft .. in a "special sense .. -that is, a sense current among practitioners 
of courtesy-then the jury could find that the Post had printed a "just criti-
cism" and render a verdict for nominal damages.!43 
As the judge's instructions and the testimony of Holt and Putnam show, 
the word pirate had acquired a specialized meaning in the American pub-
lishing business. Instead of referring to a publisher who simply reprinted a 
foreign work without authorization, it Signified deviancy from the norms of 
courtesy-specifically, the act of reprinting books '"already equitably in the 
hands of other publishers." If the Post used "pirateD in this "special sense," 
then the newspaper was doing .nothing more than joining publishers of 
good standing in publicly shaming a violator of the courtesy rules. Scholars 
of social norms refer to this kind of communal reprimand as "coordinated 
punishment" or "multilateral costly sanctions."!44 Ellickson calls it "negative 
gossip" and observes that, within close-knit communities bound by infor-
mal rules, shaming of this kind "usually works because only the extreme 
deviants are immune from the general ·obsession with neighborliness."14s 
Practitioners of trade courtesy in the nineteenth century used negative gos-
sip and public shaming to expos~ deviant pirates and to compel reform, thus 
contributing a specialized profesSional sense of "piracy" to the rhetoric of 
aggrieved authorship in the nineteenth-century. If the offenders would not 
mend their ways, then communal shaming might at least have the effect of 
encouraging others-publishers, booksellers, and purchasers-to engage 
in a further type of sanction: refusal to deal 146 Multilateral refusal to carry 
on business with the transgressing firm would force it to conform or to take 
its chances as a pariah outside the publishing comity. As later chapters will 
show, the courtesy traditions of negative gossip and public shaming were 
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seized upon by Joyce, T. S. Eliot, and other modernist figures to address the 
problem of transatlantic piracy. 
Harsher than private protest or public shammgwas the sanction of preda-
tory pricing. If a finn "printed on" a publisher with a claim to priority, the lat-
terwould sometimes reissue the disputed title at a reduced price in an effort 
to undersell the pirate. Predatory pricing became common during the cheap 
book wars of the 1830s and 18405 and again in the 18705 and 18805. In 
declining to interfere with C. S. Francis & Co.'s courtesy rights in Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning's works, Ticknor & Fields ruefully explained to Robert 
Browning in 1855 that such interference would cause Francis to "print at 
any rate, and at a cheaper rate, and perhaps set on our other books full chase, 
& try to injure us in every way.n141The established houses would sometimes 
go to great expense to beat the prices of piratical reprinters. To combat the 
cheap paper-book libraries of the 18705, Harper & Brothers launched its 
Franklin Square Library, offering reprints of backlist novels for ten cents a 
COpy.148 In 1879, Holt wrote that the Harpers "are, at considerable imme-
diate cost to themselves we fear, fighting the pirates with their own weap-
ons."l49 'The Harpers and other firms would sometimes intentionally price 
their books so low that they could not recover their own costs, believing it 
would serve as a punishment to pirates to learn that their depredations had 
created a climate in which no one coUld profit ISO "We determined," wrote 
the Harper firm in 1879, "that [the cheap reprinters] should not share our 
profits, because we intended that there should be no profit for a division. We 
began to print on ourselves."1S1 
The severest punishment of all was reserved for the worst outrages against 
courtesy. This was the sanction of retaliation, occasionally employed even 
by publishers of the first rank when their rights were threatened by another 
house. Retaliation meant printing on a transgressor by issuing one or more 
of its foreign titles at a competitive price. 'The aggressive Harper firm often 
resorted to this form of reprisal, or threats of it "If a publisher declined to 
comply with the requirements oftradecourtesy,"wroteJosephHenry Harper, 
"some method would be adopted to discipline the offender-generally by 
the printing oflower-priced editions ofhis fOreign reprints by his aggrieved 
competitor."151 In 1871, the Harpers wrote to W. E. Tunis of Detroit that the 
courtesy right to George Eliot's Middlemarch "belongs to us alike for Canada 
and the U.S.-the right of both countries having been purchased by us,n 
and that any interference would occasion "severe retaliation."lS3 Retaliation 
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could be devastating. In 1870, Harper & Brothers responded to a breach of 
courtesy on the part of Fields, Osgood & Co. by iSsuing an illustrated edi-
tion ofTennysons works. When other pubUshers piled on by printing rival 
editions, a thirty-year relationship between Tennyson and the Fields firm 
was severely eroded 154 '!he Harpers' reprisal triggered the very behavior 
that trade courtesy had been created to avoid 
Lisa Bernstein, in her work on the social norms employed in the American 
cotton industry, characterizes informal retaliations of this kind as "tit-for-tat 
strategies" that can often be "costly for the defected-against transactor to 
impos·e."155 '!he punishment of printing on an offender was often the last 
resort for respectable houses because it could be so costly. Many firms of 
good standing avoided it as both distasteful and destructive of-business 
relationships. Courtesy had been evolved to rid the industry of piratical 
behaviorj resurrecting lawless conduct, even to make a point, threatened 
reputational harm and a return to anarchy. In 1881, despite his quarrel with 
the Harper firm over Carlyle's Reminiscences, Charles Scribner chose not to 
strike back by reprinting any Harper titles, hoping that '"by not descending 
to blatant piracy. he could establish the ethical superiority of his own finn in 
the minds of British writers."I56 
When a publisher proved to be a hopeless deviant from courtesy, utterly 
indifferent to the gentlemanly code, the sanctions of negative gossip, preda-
tory pricing, and even retaliation had no effect. During the feverish cheap book 
competition of the 18705 and 1880s, such renegades became increasingly com-
mon, less interested in acquiring respectability and maintaining author asso-
ciations than in free riding on the successful experiments of other firms. '!hese 
pirates rarely offered royalties or honoraria to authors, printed in the cheapest 
formats, and exploited the publicity for which the first publisher bad paid lS7 
Such firms were often new entrants that bad nothing immediately to gain by 
adhering to courtesy and little to lose by flouting it 1he close-knit community 
of gentlemanly publishers unraveled at the edges when new or opportunistic 
firms saw a chance to build a list quickly at Uttle cost to themselves. 
Trade Courtesy: Settlement and Arbitration 
Although courtesy permitted aggrieved publishers to engage in retaliation 
and other unilateral and multilateral p'mishments, publishers often resolved 
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their disputes amicably through informal settlements called adjustments.iss 
Adjustments usually took the form of payments of compensation. For exam· 
pie, in 1860, the finn of Rudd & Carleton arranged to publish an English 
translation of Alexander von Humboldt's correspondence, only to learn 
that the Appletons had purchased advance sheets of the English edition 
and were about to issue the book. 'Ihe Appletons agreed to cede the vol· 
ume to Rudd & Carleton upon payment of £4O-the sum the Appletons 
had already invested. With monetary adjustments, practitioners of trade 
courtesy improvised a type of remedy familiar to the law: compensation for 
a party's justifiable reliance on an apparently available resource or uncon· 
tested opportunity. 
Adjustments could also be made in kind. Qparrelling publishers some· 
times sault their differences by agreeing that one house would issue a reg· 
ular cloth edition of a disputed title while the other would bring out the 
same work in an inexpensive paperbound format. If the contested book was 
one of a series, "the right to the title in question could be balanced against 
the right to succeeding volumes."ls9 Ticknor & Fields and the Harper firm 
resolved their dispute over Dickens's The Mystery of Edwin Drood in kind 
rather than through monetary compensation: Ticknor & Fields issued the 
novel in· book form, while the Harpers brought it out serially in Harper's 
Weekly.l60 Like monetary adjustments, adjustments in kind imitated formal 
legal dealings; they were the courtesy equivalent of copyright sublicensing. 
A copyright owner might grant one sublicense for serial rights, another for 
hardbound rights, and still another for paperback rights. American publish· 
ing houses accomplished this by informally divvying up the market for a 
disputed foreign title. 'Ihe extant correspondence of Charles Scribner's Sons 
from the 1870s contains many references to such amicable adjustments.16i 
'Ihe modes of informal disput~resolution employed by nineteenth· 
century American publishers resemble the extralegal ways in which sophisti· 
cated businesspersons in other industries sometimes agree to solutions that 
are not required by law. Bernstein has shown that American grain and feed 
merchants frequently resort to informal mechanisms that permit them to 
vary the terms of written contracts, sometimes out of "concern for relation· 
ships, trust, honor and decency, or fear of nonlegal sanctions such as reputa· 
tional damage or termination of a beneficial relationship.nl61'Ihese practices 
have strong parallels in the norms·based behavior of nineteenth·century 
American publishers. 'Ihe difference is that Bernstein's merchants choose to 
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sidestep existing contract law in favor of informal terms and commitments, 
whereas nineteenth-century American pubUshers were faced with a choice 
between informal rules and no rules at all. 
Finally, when publishers could not resolve disputes on their own, they 
would sometimes submit them to informal arbitration, "the contention 
being commonly left to a fellow-publisher for arbitrament"l63 Thus, trade 
courtesy provided for the resolution of disputes in an arbitral forum pre-
sided over by a neutral publisher who would apply courtesy rules or other 
equitabie principles to bring peace to the disputants. In this respect as well, 
courtesy resembles the forms of private ordering among members of trade 
associations that Bernstein has studied. 
To sum up, the punishments meted out under trade courtesy ranged 
from private protest to public shaming to predatory pricing to outright 
retaliation. Each of these sanctions involved a kind of organized self-help, 
a means of seeking redress within the limits of an informal set of prescrip-
tions. Although courtesy existed to stamp out aggressive, piratical behavior, 
ultimately an aggrieved publisher could turn pirate, within the rules, when 
it had no choice but to retaliate on a stubborn house or a confirmed devi-
ant Settlements-informal rightings of the balance through adjustments in 
coin or in kind-were the preferred mode of resolving disputes. But when 
two houses failed to make peace, a third pubUsher could step in and serve 
as an arbitrator. This ingenious and elaborate system of rights and remedies 
ultimately rested on a"legal void-the legislated absence of copyrights for 
foreign authors-and served to mitigate, though not wholly to avert) a pub-
lic goods problem that threatened to destroy incentives to invest in the dis-
semination of uncopyrighted works by foreign authors. 
The Persistence of Pirates: First-Mover Advantages 
and the Second Public Domain 
At the edges of trade courtesy there were always eager opportunists. 
Sometimes theywere extremely aggressive and numerous) especially during 
the publishing wars of the 1830s-40s and 1870s-80s when cheap books 
and inexpensive modes of distribution made the reprinting of unprotected 
fOreign works irresistibly attractiv.e to many firms. Publishers who operated 
outside of courtesy were frankly referred to as pirates, and their activities 
50 • WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS 
occasioned many colorful epithets during the latter part of the century. 
Courtesy, or what one commentator called the "gentility of this modified 
piracy," could "not obscure the lucrative character of the bUSiness"; as aresult, 
new houses sprang up, operated by "these cheap Ishmaelites of the trade" 
who defied the courtesy system.l64 Ishmael, renegade, outlaw-the pirate 
was a thing apart, an "outside barbarian" whom Henry Holt contrasted with 
those "men of exceptional character" who reared and dwelled in the respect· 
able house of COurtesy.l6S Holt referred to the outsiders as "unscrupulous 
reprinters of all successful stories, who pay authors nothing and publish 
in cheap pamphlets without covers."l66 Years earlier, Ticknor & Fields had 
dubbed pirates "keen·scented rascals, our friends in the Craft."l67 
The major houses took considerable financial risks in publishing 
uncopyrighted foreign works. The inner circle of genteel publishers could 
be relied upon to observe the principles of courtesy, but the "outside bar· 
barians" had no honor to uphold, no trading partners to impress, and 
no incentive to accept a code that could bring few immediate, tangible 
benefits. The major publishers had an additional strength, however; they 
enjoyed what economists call first·mover advantage. Because of their size 
and resources, the large houses were able to obtain advance sheets or 
early proofs of foreign books just ahead of publication abroad. Profits lay 
in being first to the American market with new titles, and a head start of 
only a few days could mean the difference between success and failure. l68 
While publishers could rely on courtesy to restrain their respectable com· 
petitors, first·mover advantage was necessary to steal a march on the c~eap 
Ishmaelites. The combination of courtesy and first·mover advantage was 
the key to profits. 
As early as the 1820s, the Carey firm of Philadelphia was glad to obtain 
a head start of just two days over piratical competitors. The firm wrote 
Sir Walter Scott's Edinburgh publisher in 1823, 
We have rec'd Quentin Durward most handsomely and have Game com-
pletely in our hands this time. In 28 hours after receiving it:, we had 1500 
copies off or ready to go, and the whole Edition is now nearly distributed. 
In two days we shall pubUsh it here and in New York, and the Pirates may 
print it as soon as they please. 1he opposition Edition ~be out in about 
48 hours after they have one of our Copies but we shall have complete and 
entire possession of every market in the Country for a short time."!9 
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The "Game" was all about being first to the market. In 1855, Ticknor & 
Fields urged Robert Browning to send advance copies of a new work "just as 
early as it is possible to do so that we may have a full months start before our 
brethren of the trade smell the EngUsh copies across the sea."I70 In the 1880s, 
an authorized publisher's need for precious lead time still generated anxious 
discussion in the trade journals: 
A publisher who reprints in this country a popular English book, which 
he secures by paying the author for the sheets, has now, we believe, only 
about a week's sales from which to derive his profit At the end of that 
time the pirate has caught up with him, published the book in a cheap 
form, and made the authorized edition unprofitable. 171 
An advantage of days or even hours was critical to these ventures. In this 
respect, nineteenth-century American publishers ran risks similar to those 
faced today by fashion designers, who likewise lack copyright protection in 
their creations and are menaced by rapid free riding. Discussing first-mover 
advantages in the fashion industry, Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman 
note that in the short interval between the appearance of new&shion designs 
and the activities of copyists, design originators can "gain the the lion's share 
of revenues from their designs and will continue to engage in innovation."17l 
Similarly, it was the brief period between authorized publication and piracy, 
supplemented by the protections of courtesy, that allowed Putnam, Holt, 
Appleton, and other major houses to earn their profits. '!he large sums paid 
to such authors as Dickens, 'Ihackeray, Trollope, and George Eliot were "for 
the privilege of a few days' priority."173 
Courtesy was a thin barrier against the work of determined pirates. A 
publisher might enjoy a courtesy-based relationship with a popular for-
eign author for years, only to lose the association overnight after some 
incident-a competitor's retaliation, perhaps-triggered a feeding frenzy 
among the cheap reprint firms. Houses that observed courtesy regarded 
their foreign titles nervously, as if they were protected by the most fragile 
of copyrights.174 As previously noted, the young fUm of.Grosset & Dunlap 
justified reprinting Kipling's works without permission on the ground that 
his books had already appeared in so many unauthorized American editions 
that they had lost the aura of courtesy protection. The firm regarded itself 
as "honorable pirates, because to our credit be it said that in no case did we 
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ever reprint anything that had not become public property by having been 
reprinted indiscriminately by about everyone else in the business."17s 
It might strike modem legal sensibilities as bizarre for an uncopyrighted 
work to be desaibed as having become "public property: but it is a redun-
dancy explained by the institution of trade courtesy. Courtesy raised a work 
up out of the public domain, gave it the status of private ProPerty, and caused 
the market to treat it as a public good clothed with the privileges of legal 
monopoly. 'The quasi-copyright enjoyed by such a work exerted a civilizing 
influence on participating houses and redounded to the benefit of other-
wise helpless fOreign authors and publishers. Supported by informal cour-
tesy norms, publishers put on respectability, foreign authors expected and 
received honoraria or royalties, and market failure was averted for the sale of 
foreign titles. 'The magic of this informal system might continue undisturbed 
for years until one day an outside barbarian decided to seize upon some 
courtesy-protected work and to issue it in a cheapi flimsy edition. 'The spell 
broken, other reprint houses would leap in and try their luck with the same' 
title. Suddenly, the artificial order of courtesy was temporarily wrecked by 
the anarchy of an unregulated commons. 'The trade now regarded the for-
eign work as having returned to its fallen condition among the heterogene-
ous mass of materials in the commons. For adherents of courtesy, this loss 
of reCOgnized exclusivitywas a lapse into a renewed public domain, a second 
death of protection. 
Yet, as Grosset & Dunlap; experience suggests, the free availability of a 
popular work could benefit new entrants in the publishing trade, even as 
it injured the vested interests of older houses. Young firms could develop 
book lists free of costly overhead and the risks of experimenting with new 
or unknown authors. 'The publiCI tOO, could benefit from aggressive com-
petition for cheapi popular books. 'The Harpers acknowledged in 1877 
that occasional breakdowns in courtesy resulted in advantages to book 
buyers: 
'!he American expedient of the "Law of Thlde Courtesy" answers very 
well in most cases, for while it generally respects the arnngements made 
by a British author with his American publisher I it leaves open a way for 
reprisals on unWr houses, and the people are benefited occasionally by a 
free fight, in the course of which, while rival publishers are fighting over 
some tempting morsel, the reading public devours it.1711 
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Here, the Harpers hinted at another way in which courtesy mirrored copy-
right law: in its creation of monopolies in public goods. 1he familiar costs of 
monopoly-increased prices and an artificial scarcity of goods-were expe-
rienced under trade courtesy, just as they are in markets controlled by for-
mal laws. These effects did not go unnoticed, and the courtesy of the trade 
had many detractors. 
The Decline of Courtesy: Trusts, literary Agents, 
and International Copyright 
During the 18705 and 18805, intense competition among American reprint-
ers of cheap, poorly made foreign books threatened many firms with eco-
nomic ruin. These pirate houses largely ignored the principles of courtesy 
and reprinted indisaiminate1y. During 1886 alone, twenty-six cheap librar-
ies issued more than fifteen hundred different volumes. A large number of 
these were dime novels; many others were foreign reprints published with-
out regard to courtesy.l771he next year, paper-covered fOreign titles were sell-
ing at prices from ten to fifty cents, and profit margins were vanishing. '!he 
manufacturing trade needed to be sustained, however, and new high-speed 
cylinder presses, folding machines, inexpensive paper materials, and low 
postage rates contributed to the frenzy.l78 "The law of evolution applies to 
the reprinting business as to everything else," remarked a writer for the New 
York Herald in 1889. "The fittest will survive. And the fittest should survive 
whether he be a 'pirate' or a 'courtesy of the trade publisher:"I79 The mar-
ket was soon glutted with cheap foreign books, and publishers of all stripes 
began to turn to the prospect of international copyright as a possible solu-
tion. At the same time, unrestricted piracy destabilized trade COurtesy.lBO 
Even as the major firms tried to uphold its prinCiples, the courtesy system 
was repeatedly pulled under by the riptide of competition. The respectable 
houses roundly blamed the pirate reprinters for the loss of dignity and prof-
its in publishing. 
For their part, the cheap reprinters indignantly denied that they were 
pirates and proclaimed themselves reformers seeking to abolish the privi-
leges enjoyed by the clubby firms that had selfishly adopted the courtesy 
of the trade. George Munro, an industrious publisher of dime novels and 
founder of the Seaside Library of inexpensive books, argued that the "cheap 
54 • WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS 
Ubraries have broken down the Chinese or rather American wall of trade 
courtesy and privilege" that had been erected solely for the "monopoly of 
pubUshers in this country: These haughty book barons, Munro asserted, 
"dictated terms, and precious low ones too, to the [foreign] authors, on 
a basis of non-interference among themselves." Munro was claiming, in 
essence, that courtesy operated horizontally to benefit publishers by arti-
ficially maintaining monopoly prices, but did not work vertically to help 
foreign authors or to make books more affordable for the masses. Munro 
even hailed the possibility of "international copyright" -that is, American 
copyright protection for foreign authors-as an impending defeat for the 
courtesy cabal. '"From this time forth," he declared, "we shall have a free ' 
field and no favor, and the longest finger takes the largest plum:181 
Munro and others in the cheap reprint business assailed the gentlemanly 
club of publishers as a collusive trust or monopoly. The established houses 
responded by portraying themselves as honorable and decent, in contrast to 
the lesser breeds without the law of courtesy. Holt named himself, along with 
"Willie Appleton, Harry Harper, Haven Putnam, [and] Charles Scribner,Jr.," as 
among the core of courtesy-abiding houses. "[S]ome publishers," he sneered, 
more or less of specialties and sometimes of piracies, who did not know 
the leading group very well, supposed it to be a sort of trust, protecting 
each other and sharing all good things among themselvesj and that the 
only way to get into the publishing business was to reprint books already 
published by these leaders.1G 
Holt always denied the charge that the large pubUshing houses were a bul-
lying trust and that courtesy was the glue that held it together. There was 
"no close corporation about it," he once testified in court. "[A]nybody is 
welcome who will behave himsel£"l83 But the cheap reprint firms and the 
new startups disagreed. They spurned a welcome mat that bid them recog-
nize the courtesy claims of the veteran houses even as it withheld the pres-
tige and leverage necessary to enjoy the benefits such a system conferred. 
These pirates were indiscreet enough to remind the major firms of their own 
raffish beginnings, and they justified their freebooting methods in the same 
way that Mosher did his: foreign works were lawfully in the American pubUc 
domain and were freely available to all; any attempt to claim such works and 
call it courtesywas simply a game played by the haves, to the detriment of the 
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have-nots. Unrestrained competition would break down courtesy and ben-
efit the book-reading public by placing "good cheap" editions of important 
works "within the reach of students, schoolteachers, and others of moderate 
means."l84 'These claims echoed the republican rhetoric that proponents of 
reprint culture had used to defeat advocates ofintemational copyright in the 
antebellum period.1SS 
Like Munro, John W. Lovell-"Book-A-Day Lovell" -defied the pub-
lishing establishment and attacked trade courtesy as a monopoly posing as 
a piety. He argued that aggressive competition among American publish-
ers for fOreign works was the key to keeping prices down and sales brisk. 
Everything he did, he claimed, was for the masses.l86 Lovell was a master of 
a populist, anticorporate rhetoric aimed directly at his genteel competitors. 
With bold sarcasm, he urged the "younger and smaller houses" to "Go in 
heartily for the 'courtesy of the trade' and-~ You will find that every-
thing is expected of you and very little given you."l81 '!he publisher Isaac K. 
Funk, who was frequently charged with rank piracy, attacked courtesy as a 
"law" that pad not been "framed in the interest of authors or of the public." 
It is a "right of possession" based primarily on the principle, or lack of prin-
ciple, of first grab. It has proved itself inefficient to protect even the clique . 
of publishers who framed it ..• 'The "law" has proved itself an injustice to 
authors, a calamity to the public, a miserably clumsy and weak substitute 
for that law which right and public morality demand-the international 
copyright 1aw.188 
Funk painted courtesy as no better than an aggressive grab at the resources 
of the public domain, a raw claim of first occupancy undignified by the enti-
tlements ofLockean labor in the commons. Genuine copyright protection 
for foreign authors-though undeniably a legal monopoly-now seemed 
superior, in the minds of Funk and other agitators for refonn, to the cliquish, 
hidebound monopoly artificially maintained by the prestige houses. Funk, 
Lovell, and Munro carried the attack to the established firms with an evan-
gelical and egalitarian fervor. 
'The perception that courtesy was an anticompetitive trust operated 
by a chosen few undoubtedly contributed to the decline of the infonnal, 
norms-based system. Authors themselves sometimes rebelled against the 
principle of association that required them to cleave to a single publisher 
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as if "choosing a wife; a simile suggested by Holt to describe "the normal 
relation of author and publisher [of] mutual confidence and helpfulness."'89 
Dickens moved opportunistically from one American publisher to another 
and in one instance, at least, obtained two contracts for the same book.l90 
Holt had been Wtlliam James's publisher for years, but when Scribner's 
made an offer for his new volume of essays, The Wdl to Believe, James invited 
Holt to make a competing offer, saying he would give the book to the high-
est bidder. Holt remonstrated, whereupon James, shocked to find himself a 
shuttlecock in the courtesy game, accused Holt of trying to undermine his 
negotiations with Scribner's.191 James wound up publishing the book with 
Longmans, Green & Co., after Houghton refused it. Holt's attempt to pre-
serve the "normal relation" of author and publisher had infuriated James; 
he recognized the anticompetitive nature of courtesy as an assault on his 
pocketbook. 
Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, one year ~re pas-
sage of the Chace International Copyright Act. The Sherman Act prohibited 
"[ e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acfJ in restraint of trade or commerce" and criminalized the acts of " [e]very 
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce,"19l The law was aimed at monopolies, combinations, and cartels 
that harmed competition in the marketplace. Horizontal restraints of trade 
were thought to be especially pernicious and often were deemed violations 
of the Sherman Act. In 1898, six manufacturers of cast-iron pipe who had 
conspired to allocate among themselves the right to serve particular custom-
ers in certain regions were held to have violated the act 193 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit arrived at this conclusion even though the con-
spiracywas only a partial restraint of trade and other cast-iron manufacturers 
had remained outside the cartel The participating manufacturers had divided 
up the market and insulated themselves from competition in ways that tended 
toward monopoly and potentially deprived the public of the advantages Bow-
ing from free competition. 
The publishing houses that practiced trade courtesy were plainly com-
bining in a horizontal restraint of trade. Instead of splitting the market up 
into exclusive territories and customers, as the cast-iron cartel did, publish-
ers divided the free cultural commons into exclUSively assigned books and 
authors, each publisher tacitly honoring every other publisher's courtesy 
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title to a public domain work. This agreement to refrain from poaching 
on other houses potentially injured foreign authors because there was no 
competition to better the offer of the first publisher to claim COurtesy.l94 
This was what economists today call oligopsony, control of the market by 
a few buyers-in this ease, the publishers who purchased foreign authors' 
permission to publish. "When two publishers are seeking an author," wrote 
George Haven Putnam, "the proportion of the proceeds offered to the 
author, goes Up."l!1S Although Charles Scribner asserted that he knew of Uno 
recognized courtesy rights among publishers which restrict an author from 
changing his publishers if he desires to do 50;196 the concerted alignment 
of publishers against authors' mobility, and the many attested refusals of 
publishers to treat with any author belonging to another house, suggest 
that authors were harmed financially by the courtesy cartel.l97 The publish-
ers would have retorted that foreign authors should have been delighted 
to rec~ anything for books that were free for the taking in the United 
States. 
There was also a form of oligopoly here, control of the market by a few 
sellers. Publishers adhering to courtesy effectively agreed to allow fellow 
publishers to fix the price of-public domain works at levels artificially height-
ened by courteous treatment of authors and also to reduce the supply of 
copies. Constraints on price and supply occur as a result of ordinary copy-
right protection, of course, but copyrights are legal monopolies granted by 
Congress under the authority of the U.S. Constitutionj trade courtesy, in 
contrast, created. extralegal monopoly effects, fabricated through publish-
ers' mutual forbearance to compete in free, public goods. Courtesy resem-
bled in certain respects the combination that in the 1930s acted through 
the Fashion Originators' Guild, an American fashion-design cartel, to limit 
"style piracy" within the ranks of American garment and textile manufac-
turers. Like fOreign works in the nineteenth century, fashion designs were 
not protected by copyrights, but the Guild, determined to stamp out piracy, 
refused to sell garments to retailers who sold pirated fashions, and com-
pelled retailers to sign agreements pledging to forswear the sale of such cop-
ies. The Guild registered American designers and their creations and fined 
members who violated the rules. The U.S. Supreme Court in 1941 held that 
the Guild's program violated the Sherman Act because it narrowed the out-
lets for buying and selling textiles and garments, took away the freedom of 
members, and suppressed competition in the sale of unregistered textiles 
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and copied designs-all tending to deprive the public of the benefits of free 
competition. 198 
'Ihere are obvious differences between courtesy and the fashion-design 
cartel, not least in that American publishers did not regularly organize 
boycotts of booksellers that handled the stock of pirate reprinters, or force 
booksellers to sign pledges to carry only courtesy-protected books. Yet the 
horizontal agreement to control competition in uncopyrighted garments, 
which the Supreme Court deemed illegal per se under the Sherman Act, 
shares broad features with the tacit agreement of the dozen powerful pub-
lishers to eliminate competition among themselves for a foreign author's 
book and to allow one of their number to dictate the price and supply of 
copies. 'Ihe tendency of courtesy to deprive authors and book buyers of the 
benefits of real competition is clear and after 1890 might have been chal-
lenged by the U.S. government or an injured private party. When publishers 
and booksellers combined, at the turn of the 'century, to combat massive 
price-cutting by fOrming associations to maintain a uniform level for book 
prices, the New York department store R. H. Macy &Co. sued the American 
Publishers' Association for antitrust violations. After years of litigation, 
the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in 1913 that the association's 
net-pricing system violated the Sherman Act. By agreeing to prohibit the 
sale ofbooks-copynghted and uncopyrighted-to price-cutting retailers, 
the publishers and booksellers had colluded to act in restraint oftrilde.l99 
'Ihe nineteenth-century courtesy publishers, like the members of the 
American Publishers' Association and the Fashion Originators' Guild, con-
spired to suppress competition in uncopyrighted works. Although trade 
courtesy was not challenged in the courts, the legal climate at th~ turn of the 
century disfavored the kind of horizontal restraint of trade that the major 
publishing houses pursued as a matter of honor. The openly anticompeti-
tive nature of their arrangements most Ukely contributed to the.decline and 
seeming disappearance of courtesy in the earlyyears of the twentieth century. 
The cheap reprint houses had mercilessly assailed the genteel publishers as 
a trust or monopoly; the antitrust laws condemned horizontal restraints as 
illegal per se. Trade courtesy withered in this inhospitable climate. 
Also contributing to the erosion of courtesy was the rise of th~ literary 
agent in the 1870s and 1880s. Agents helped authors to grasp the complexi-
ties of copyright and contract law and to exploit increasingly valuable mar-
kets for such subsidiary rights as magazine serialization, translation, and 
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dramatization.lOCI 'These savvy middlemen became especially valuable to 
British authors who had to deal "with hustling Americans so many miles 
away" and who often feared that "Blank. & Company [were] not paying all 
theymight be made to pay, and that some other house might come down with 
a better advance. "201 Literary agency was, by definition, inimical to courtesy. 
British-based agents like A. P. Watt and, later, Albert Curtis Brown and J. B. 
Pinker, along with their American counterparts, saw it as their duty to foster 
economically adversarial relationships between authors and publishers and 
to obtain bids from multiple houses so as to maximize authors' remuneration 
(and their own percentages). As Mary Ann Gillies has noted, many publish-
ers viewed the agent as "an unwelcome, opportunistic interloper."2Ol William 
-Heinemann, President of the Publishers' Association of Great Britain and 
Ireland, called the agent "a parasite living on our vital forces."203 
Equally disgusted, Henry Holt described the agent as "a very serious 
detriment to literature and a leech on the author, sucking blood entirely 
out of proportion to his laterservices."204 Holt complained that agents 
struck at the heart of the courtesy relationship between authors and 
publishers, undermining its continuity by their "fine work."20.S American 
publishers, accustomed to playing an awncular role with their authors, 
felt that agents threatened the integrity and stability of this time-honored 
relationship. In particular, literary agents interfered with the prinCiple 
of association, whereby foreign authors voluntarily remained with the 
American publishers that had first claimed them, and made it more dif-
ficult for publishers to justify the uncontested honorarium or royalty for 
which authors without copyrights were expected to be grateful. Agents 
introduced the friction of market competition into the hermetic paternal-
ism of courtesy. 
In addition to the pressures of ruinous competition, antitrust law, and 
literary agency, dramatic changes in American copyright law had a direct 
impact on courtesy. In 1891, Congress passed the Chace International 
Copyright Act, 'at last granting formal legal protection to foreign authors. 
'The struggle for that reform had gone on for decades. Efforts to establish a 
reciprocal Anglo-American copyright law had repeatedly met with obsta-
cles. British law made copyright protection available to foreign authors, 
including Americans, but a comparable privilege did not exist for British 
authors in the United States.2116 In response to a petition presented by British 
authors, Senator Henry Clay introduced a bill in Congress in 1837 that would 
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have recognized British copyrights in the United States. The bill encoun-
tered strong opposition from the American book trade, however, and never 
became law. In 1854, President Franklin Pierce signed an Anglo-American 
copyright treaty providing for reciprocal recognition of the rights of authors 
and publishers in the two countries. Once again, stubborn resistaitce from 
publishers and booksellers caused the treaty to fall short of ratification by 
the Senate. 207 Writing in 1880, British poet and essayist Matthew Arnold 
remarked that the United States had repeatedly "refused to entertain the 
question of international copyright"108 A series of Anglo-American copy-
right bills introduced in Congress between 1886 and 1890 met with the 
same fate. 
When Congress finally granted rights to foreign authors in the Chace 
Act of 1891, protection came at the price oflarge concessions to American 
typesetters and platemakers. Chief among these was the express condition 
that a foreign (or domestic) book in any language could acquire copyright 
protection in the United States only if the book was "printed from type set 
within the limits of the United States, or from plates made therefrom, or 
from negatives, or drawings on stone made within the limits of the United 
States, or from transfers made therefrom" anti.. if two copies of the book were 
depOSited in the Copyright Office on or before the date of first publication 
anywhere else. 209 These provisions were known collectively as the manu-
facturing clause. Along with the stringent deposit requirement, the clause 
effectively made first or simultaneous manufacture and publication in the 
United States a condition of American copyright for any book published 
abroad. 210 Although resourceful or well-connected. foreign authors might 
be able to satisfy these onerous requirements, many others could not In 
place of an absence of copyright protection, Congress had granted fOreign 
authors a form of protection that was openly and avowedly protectionist-
conditioned upon compliance with inflexible rules that benefited American 
typesetters, platemakers, printers, and bookbinders. 
The Chace Act was a compromise between advocates of international 
copyright and the manufacturing trades that feared loss of work if foreign 
authors Were allowed to secure American copyrights unconditionally. If for-
eign books suddenly received automatic protection, these industries would 
be forced to compete against COpyrighted imports and editions printed from 
type set overseas and thus would lose the benefits they had enjoyed when 
foreign works lacked cOpyright protection altogether. A manufacturing 
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clause had long seemed expedient to legislators and lobbyists. When in 
1837 the manufacturing interests protested that international copyright 
"would jeopardize an industry employing an estimated 200,000 persons 
with a capital investment of between $30 and $40 million," Henry Clay 
introduced a bill that conditioned copyright for British and French authors 
on American manufacture of their books.lII In 1884, the Harper firm argued 
for manufacturing provisions that would require protected foreign books 
to be printed in the United States, "chiefly in order that they may not be 
made inconvenient and unobtainable, which would be the case if the base 
of supplies were so remote as London:' The Harpers denied that they were 
taking a protectionist position: "we would not prohibit the importation of 
stereotype or electrotype plates."lI2 Some publishing houses that had their 
own printing plants benefited directly from the Chace Act's manufactUring 
clausej others were hopeful that it "represented a part of a design to bring 
the manufacture of books for the entire English-speaking world under the 
control of American firms."1l3 
The manufacturing clause was especially hard on foreign authors writ-
ing in languages other than English. The difficulty of producing an English 
translation of a work prior to its publication abroad was insuperable for most 
authors. George Haven Putnam observed, 
The condition of American manufacture, added to the requirement of 
simultaneous publication, made it almost impOSSible to secure American 
copyright for the books for which it was necessary to produce an English 
version before the manufacturing could be begun. We had given copy-
right to Germany, France, and Italy in form, but in fact, the authors of 
these countries could secure but a trifling possibility of advantage from 
their American marketll4 
Putnam also complained that the manufacturing clause was unnecessarily 
doing the protectionist work of a tariff on books. He contrasted American 
and European approaches to copyright legislation, pointing out that in 
England, France, and Germany the book manufacturing interests were not 
heard on the question of copyright but, rather, that these interests "were 
properly to be considered in the rooms of the tariff committees." Congress, 
Putnam lamented, had shown itself more ready to listen to the typographi-
cal unions and papermakers than to "authors, artists, or composers."2IS As 
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I show in chapter 3, Ezra Pound recognized that the manufacturing clause 
and book tariffs were twin protectionist devices that harmed the interests of 
creators. 
* * * 
By the dawn of the twentieth century, trade courtesy had become difficult 
to practice openly. The climate of trust-busting, punctuated by antitrust 
lawsuits and the clamor of politidans, made the proud collusiveness of the 
genteel publishers an antiquated and suspect chivalry. Changes in the book 
trade, moreover, had eroded the basic purpose of courtesy. The vigorous 
ministrations of literary agents revealed the faithful monogamy of author 
and publisher to be dispensable in many cases; real competition, commen-
surate with an expanding literary marketplace, awakened an entrepreneurial 
spirit in authors. The experience of uncontrolled competition and piracy in 
the 1880s made courtesy seem fusty and ineffective. 
More visibly, the Chace Act, with its new protections for foreign authors, 
created the perception that the courtesy code was superfluous. Gentlemanly 
honoraria gave way to up-front sums and backend royalties, paid not exgratia 
but as a matter oflaw. No longer were advance sheets rushed across the ocean 
in order to steal a few days' march on competitors; such first-to-marketstrat-
egies belonged to a world in which the cultural commons was augmented 
daily by unprotected materials from abroad, and the race and the profits were 
to the swift. COpyright protection for foreign authors now required domes-
tic typesetting and, as a practical matterl'domestic printingj simply binding 
sheets that had been set and printed abroad would not satisfy the manufac-
turing clause. The pressures generated by the law's manufacturing require-
ments ensured that authors and publishers would still be racing against time, 
but the compulsions were now legal ones, not fueled by contests with pirates 
or subject to a code of honor among statute-created thieves. 
Did the statutory commands of the Chace Act improve on the 
norms-based informality of trade courtesyl Were copyrights for foreign-
. ' .. 
ers superior to courtesy relationships? Both gains and 10ssesresUlteo from 
passage of the Chace Act. Foreign authors could noW look to unifonrl fed-
erallaw for protection against piracy instead of to an informal system of 
self-regulation adhered to by a dozen major publishers, a system subject 
to occasional breakdowns and always menaced at the edges by pirates. But 
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copyright law was complex and technical; its machinery was operated by 
lawyers, its coercions administered by courts. Under the law's frigid rules, a 
dispute between publishers, or between publisher and author, was no longer 
adjusted by honorable concessions; deviants were not punished with pub-
lic shaming or swashbuckling retaliations. The Chace Act was a bureaucra-
tization of honor. Now, complaints were filed and served, motions made, 
infringements adjudicated, and injunctions and damages ordered. Although 
American publishers continued to preserve an ideal of fairness in their deal-
ings with foreign authors, the old paternalistic spirit had been diminished 
and, with it, some of the sense of professional camaraderie and joint pursuit 
of honorable ends. 
Foreign authors may have benefited in still other ways from the former 
lack of copyright protection in the United States. According to B. Zorina 
Khan, it can be argued that piracy allowed foreign authors "to reap higher 
total returns from the expansion of the market" and to enjoy the benefits 
of network effects and bundled products, such as best sellers and lecture 
tours.216 During the 1880s, the cheap reprinter John B. Alden told foreign 
authors that they should be pleased with unremunerated circulation of 
their books in the United States because the widespread exposure would 
help their sales when international copyright finally did come.lI7 The chief 
drawback to the Chace Act, however, was its manufacturing clause. Many 
foreign authors simply could not comply with its strict requirements. 
Protectionist and discriminatory, the manufacturing clause, together with 
other copyright formalities, prevented the United States from joining the 
Berne Convention for a century after other major nations had Signed it in 
the late 1880s.218 
But the manufacturing clause did more than create obstacles for foreign 
authors and opprobrium for American lawmakers in world opinion. It per-
petuated, to a Significant degree, the commons problem that international 
copyright had been enacted to solve. For the many foreign authors and 
publishers who could not satiSfy its rigors, the clause played the same role 
that the affirmative withholding of copyrights had played in earlier statutes. 
Failure to accomplish book manufacture on U.S. soil deprived these authors 
of protection, feeding the American public domain with fresh materials 
that were freely and lawfully available to any publisher, just as aU foreign 
works had been prior to 1891. Legalized piracy had not been banished by 
the Chace Act; it had merely been limited in scope. Nor did trade courtesy 
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vanish altogetherj it still existed, albeit in less vigorous and exacting forms, 
as a publishing ethic, a pattern of behavior, and an occasional tool for resolv-
ing disputes in the book trade. No longer openly practiced by publishing, 
houses, it nevertheless quietly governed reputable publishers' relations with 
each other and with foreign authors. 
To sum up, when historians ask whether the Chace Act successfully 
addressed the copyright problems faced by foreign authors, they should 
not measure its success in a conceptual vacuum. They should not assess the 
protections and incentives created by the Chace Act against some general 
notion of market failure, treating foreign copyright protection as the sole, 
stark alternative to piracy and the public goods problem. Rather, the Chace 
Act should be measured, at least in part, against the successes (and failures) 
of trade courtesy, the preexisting system of extralegal norms that had sought 
to bridge the copyright gap for American publishers and fOreign authors. 
As Dotan Oliar and Christopher Sprigman note, "Intellectual property laws 
come with costs as well as benefits, and these must be assessed relative to 
those of non-legal regulation. In some cases social norms may do a reason-
ably good job of controlling appropriation, but perhaps not in others." They 
add that "the case for legal intervention is greater if we see Significant dis-
satisfaction with such non-legal background incentives."ll' There was dissat-
isfaction with trade courtesy, but much satisfaction with it as well. Whether 
the uniformity costs and compliance burdens that the Chace Act and its 
statutory successors imposed were offset by the benefits they conferred 
on publishers and foreign authors is a question that is addressed implicitly 
throughout this study. 
'!he following chapters tell the story of transatlantic modernism's encoun-
ter with u.s. cOpyright law, lawful piracy, and the American public domain. 
1hey also show that courtesy survived well into the twentieth century and 
that elements of that informal, norms-based system were deftly repurposed 
by James Joyce, T. S. Eliot, Bennett Cerf, and other modernist figures to 
combat piracy, to protect and consolidate American markets, and to lay 
the groundwork for authorial celebrity. The tradition of courtesy, with its 
shaming sanctions, authorized editions, and ex gratia payments, played a 
critical role in the production and consumption of modernism in the United 
States. 
